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NATIONAL PRODUCT
LIABILITY LEGISLATION:
IN SEARCH FOR THE BEST OF ALL
POSSIBLE WORLDS
AARON TWERSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Product liability legislation at the federal level is upon us.1 The
erratic and sometimes idiosyncratic performance of the courts has
hastened its coming. There is a deeply held and widespread belief
that product liability law is unstable, unfair and unduly open-ended.!
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University. A.B. Beth Medrash Elyon Research
Institute 1962, B.S. University of Wisconsin 1970, J.D. Marquette University 1965.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Shlomo Twerski, third-
year student at Hofstra Law School, for his research assistance and insightful observa-
tions that have been emobodied in this article.
1. Currently, two major pieces of legislation that seek to set uniform federal
standards for all products liability litigation are before Congress. The PRODUCT LIABIL-
ITY ACT, S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 6878 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Bill], and the PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT of 1982, H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REC. 9529 (1981) [hereinafter cited as House Bill]. See Appendix A for full
text of the Senate Bill and Appendix B for full text of the House Bill. Congress
already enacted earlier this year the PRODUCT LIABILITY RISK RETENTION ACT of 1981,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3901-3904 (West 1982), facilitating the establishment by sellers of prod-
uct liability risk retention groups and the purchase of product liability insurance on a
group basis.
Other bills bearing on the product liability crisis have also been introduced: H.R.
970, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 132 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1981) (bill to amend
the Internal Revenue Code to exempt from income tax trusts established for the pay-
ment of product liability claims); H.R. 1991, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 572
(daily ed. Feb. 23, 1981) (bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code to allow deducting
for contributions to product liability loss reserve accounts); H.R. 1504, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 275 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1982) (bill to provide governmemt indemnity
for suppliers of products to the government for which the suppliers become liable for
loss); H.R. 5261, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 9928 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981) (bill
to provide uniform federal product liability standards). In the administrative arena, the
U.S. Department of Commerce promulgated the Uniform Product Liability Act as a
model products code to be adopted voluntarily by the states. See MODEL UNIFORM PRO-
DUCT LIABILITY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UPLA].
2. See House Bill § 2; UPLA, supra note 1, § 101 at 62,716. The Introduction
to the Preamble to the Model Uniform Product Liability Act also contains discussions
of the problems existing in the products liability system. Id. at 62,714-16. See generally
Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REv. 643
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Manufacturers have come to believe that they bear enormous liabil-
ity potential even though they have designed, manufactured and
marketed their products to the highest standards of integrity and
honesty. They point to ill-advised decisions of the highest courts of
California,' Pennsylvania,' New Jersey,5 and Maryland' as examples
of rulings that are harsh if not downright punitive. The attempt to
resolve many of the problems at the state level has been only mod-
erately successful. The legislative effort in the several states has
varied drastically from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.7 The patch-quilt
(1978); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Henderson, Expanding the Neg-
ligence ConcepL" Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Henderson,
Manufacturers'Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform,
56 N.C. L. REV. 625 (1978); Product Liability: Legislative Hearings on H.R. 5571, H.R.
5258, H.R. 1061, H.R. 2891, H.R. 4204, H.R. 1675, H.R. 1676, H.R. 2964, H.R. 5626
before the subcommission on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Commis-
sion on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 264-65 (1979) (state-
ment of William Herbert, representing National Association of Manufacturers); id. at
695 (statement of Kenneth Doss, Associate General Counsel, Field Crest Mills, Inc.); id.
at 830-833 (statement of Tomas Russell, General Counsel, National Product Liability
Council).
3. Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc. 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1981) (recognizing dual capacity doctrine to allow products action against employer
despite worker's compensation recovery); Barker v. Lull Eng'g. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573
P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (shifting burden to defendant to prove that product
was not defective); Ault v. Int'l. Harvester, 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1974) (allowing introduction of post-accident design change).
. 4. Azzarello v. Black Bros., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) (finding "un-
reasonably dangerous" to be inappropriate jury instruction in products case).
5. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982)
(finding manufacturer strictly liable and accountable for knowledge not available at
time of manufacture).
6. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975) (finding manufac-
turer liable for injuries incurred by scenting a candle with cologne on the grounds that
it must warn against such foreseeable usage).
7. A review of state products legislation shows the various enactments to differ
substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some legislatures have not passed any
products-related laws, while those that have legislated in the area have done so in a
variety of ways.
One route taken by the state legislatures has been to establish statutes of
limitation for product liability actions, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(a)-502(b) (Supp. 1981);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2803 (Supp. 1981); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-80-127.5, 127.6(a) (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(a)
(West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403(3) (Supp. 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, § 213(d)
(1981) (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982)); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4
-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600-5805(9) (Supp. 1982-83); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-224(1) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2(I) (Supp. 1979); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.905(2) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.060(3) (Supp. 1982).
Statutes of repose have also been enacted by many states to limit product
claims, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(a) (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127.6(1)(b)
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quality of state legislation has only added to the belief that the only
hope for uniformity will come at the federal level.' Furthermore,
(Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(a) (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.031(2) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §
6-1403(2)(a) (Supp. 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13 § 213(b) (1981) (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §
22.2(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982)); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1978); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3303(b) (Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(2) (1979); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2(II) (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-1-13(b) (Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977).
Some states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no
defect if the alleged defect results from a design that conformed to the state of the art
at the time the product was first designed or sold. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-683(1) (1982); COLO REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(a) (Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. §
34-4-20A-4(b)(4) (Burns Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411-310(2) (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-21,182 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-105(b) (1980).
Several states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no de-
fect when the design of the product or its method of manufacturing conforms to federal
or state standards. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3304(a) (Supp. 1981); N.C. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-05(3) (Supp. 1981); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.72.050(2) (1982 Supp.).
Several states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no de-
fect when someone other than the defendant alters or modifies the product in a manner
not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant and the alteration or modification is the
proximate cause of the claimant's injury. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(2) (1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572p (West Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(b)(3)
(Burns Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.320(2) (Supp. 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507-D:3 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-3 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-04
(Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.915 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-32 (Supp. 1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-10 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-108 (1980); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-15-5 (1977).
Finally, several state recognize a defense for unforeseeable misuse of the prod-
uct. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(3) (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(b) (2)
(Burns Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1979).
8. The perception that the existing disuniformity of products law throughout
the country is responsible for a number of national problems is outlined in the "Find-
ings and Purposes" section of the House Bill;
(2) The rules of products liability law in recent years have evolved
rapidly and haphazardly within and among the States such that the body of
products liability law prevailing in this Nation today is unduly complex, in-
consistent, uncertain, and imbalanced in principle.
(3) This uncertainty and confusion in products liability law, and the
resulting unpredictability of litigation outcome, has been a principal cause of
many problems of national concern, including-
(A) increased prices of consumer and industrial products;
(B) indreased strains on the court systems, including increased costs,
complexity, and frequency of litigation;
(C) increased deterrents to innovation and to the development of po-
tentially beneficial products which by their nature necessarily in-
volve some danger;
19821
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neither consumers nor manufacturers can take much solace from the
state legislation. In many aspects, the proposed federal legislation
would favor claimants who are now subject to state legislation9 and
state judicial decisions'0 that can only be described as neanderthal.
(D) increased difficulty for some manufacturers in raising capital;
(E) increased costs and decreased availability of products liability in-
surance;
(F) increased numbers of product sellers attempting to do business
without products liability insurance coverage, jeopardizing their fi-
nancial stability and the availability of compensation to injured per-
sons; and
(G) other increased burdens on interstate commerce, threatening em-
ployment and the economy in many diverse ways.
(4) Products liability insurance rates are set on the basis of nationwide,
rather than individual State, experience because a product manufactured in
one State can readily cause injury in any of the other States.
(5) A profusion of State statutes has been enacted in recent years at-
tempting to remedy these problems. Such statutes, however, have sometimes
been drafted in a crisis atmosphere without due consideration given to their
many important implications. Some such statutes have curtailed unduly the
rights of products liability claimants, and all have added to the complexity of
and inconsistency in products liability law.
(6) Because of the national scope of the manufacture and distribution of
most products, and of products liability insurance, there is little that any in-
dividual State can do to remedy these various problems of products liability
law. House Bill § 2(a)(2)-(6).
A similar section is included in the MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT. UPLA
supra note 1, § 101 at 62,716.
9. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (1982), recognizing a defense if
the defect resulted from fabrication that conformed to the state of the art at the time
the product was first sold by defendant. Senate Bill § 5 and House Bill § 5 allow a
state of art defense for design defect cases only. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(b)(6)
(Burns Supp. 1978), recognizes a state of the art defense if the product was prepared in
conformity with the generally recognized state of the art at the time the product was
designed. "Generally recognized" state of art sounds dangerously like an industry
custom defense, again a factor not embodied in Senate Bill § 5 and House Bill § 5.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:3 (Supp. 1979) provides for an absolute defense of prod-
uct alteration even where the product defect is concurrent cause. Senate Bill § 10(b)
reduces recovery to the extent that alteration was a cause of the harm, but does not
preclude recovery. House Bill §§ 5(C)(4)(A) & (B) provide that product alteration and
misuse are complete defenses even where they are concurrent causes. See infra text
accompanying notes 75-79. As such, it tracks the New Hampshire statute and does not
treat claimants fairly. The statutes of repose contained in Senate Bill § 12 (twenty-five
years), Alternate § 12 (ten years), and House Bill § 12 (ten years), give claimants a
longer period within which to institute a products action than many of the state
statutes listed supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush, 427 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. 1981), petition for
cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3024 (U.S. May 10, 1982) (No. 81-2072) (applying the patent
danger rule in a design defect case). See infra note 39. Senate Bill § 6(d)(2)(A) and
House Bill § 5(d)(3)(A) consider the obviousness of the danger with regard to the
necessity of providing warnings. Although the bills do not explicitly disapprove of the
patent danger rule, they appear, by negative inference, to preclude use of this defense
[Vol. 18
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In other instances, the state legislative solutions do not begin to ad-
dress the serious concerns of manufacturers. 1 The cacophony must
come to an end.
The more serious question today is not whether federal legisla-
tion is called for; rather, it is which issues should be addressed at
the federal level, and what should be the substantive contours of
the legislation. 2 Two bills presently pending in Congress, S. 2631
(Kasten)"3 and H.R. 5214 (Shumway),4 are far too complex. They fail
to account for the fact that product liability law will depend for its
administration on thousands of trial judges and tens of thousands of
lawyers. To impose on the courts dozens of new and undefined
terms and untold new concepts, is unwise in the extreme. These
bills, if enacted, would require several decades of judicial interpreta-
tion to unravel their ambiguities. Rather than resolving the present
uncertainties, a whole new class of doubts would be created to the
chagrin of consumers and industry alike. Furthermore, the complex
and overly-detailed provisions of the bills, governing such matters
in design defect litigation, Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d
1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979), held that the statute of limitations begins to run from
the time the cause of action accrued, although plaintiff has not yet discovered the in-
jury. Senate Bill § 12(d), Alternate § 12(c), and House Bill § 12(a) commence the statu-
tory limitation period from the time claimant discovered, or should have discovered
the harm. (The Senate Bill sections provide for a two year period from discovery of the
harm; the House Bill allows a claimant three years from the discovery of the harm and
its cause).
11. While several states have enacted legislation regarding punitive damages,
e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295, (West 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp.
1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.203) (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1979),
many states have not enacted legislation addressed to this area. Another significant
problem not addressed by many state legislatures is the interraction of workmen's
compensation schemes and product liability recoveries.
12. The author's position favoring national products legislation is a change from
previously held opinions expressing opposition to such legislation. See Twerski &
Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment 28
DRAKE L. REV. 221, 256-57 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as Twerski and Weinstein, A
Critique of the UPLL]; Twerski, Rebuilding the Citadel, The Legislative Assault on
the Common Law, 15 TRIAL (No. 11) 55 (1979).
The metamorphasis has been gradual. My research on an article on directed ver-
dict practice, Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in
Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982) [hereinafter cit~ed as Twerski, Seizing the Middle
Ground], convinced me that sensible limitations must be imposed on design defect
litigation. Furthermore, recent developments have made clear that the "product liabil-
ity crisis" is not something conjured up by the manufacturers' lobby. It is real and de-
serves serious consideration. The suggestions contained herein, however, are consis-
tent with my general objection to a full-blown codification of the law of products liabili-
ty. My proposals are for directed and focused solutions to high-profile problems.
13. Senate Bill, supra note 1.
14. House Bill, supra note 1.
19821
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as product misuse, 5 alteration,16 and worker's compensation, 7 appear
to be a massive intrusion by the federal government on the
longstanding authority of states to work out the fine points of tort
law. Federal legislation should address clearly perceived federal pro-
blems and no more. 8 It should not rewrite the common law of torts.
15. Senate Bill § 10(a); House Bill § 5(c)(4)(A). See infra text accompanying notes
77-78, 127-132.
16. Senate Bill § 10(b); House Bill § 5(c)(4)(B). See infra text accompanying notes
77-78, 127-132.
17. Senate Bill § 11. House Bill § 10, dealing with workmen's compensation,
avoids the complexities of the Senate Bill and conforms with the author's suggestion
that plaintiff's recovery be reduced by the amount of worker's compensation recovery.
See infra text accompanying notes 146-162.
18. It is difficult to surgically separate the arguments dealing with the substan-
tive merits of the legislation and the fact that the legislation is being promulgated at
the federal level. Those who oppose the legislation have also sounded the clarion for
states' rights and the traditional prerogative of states to control tort litigation. Prod-
uct Liability Act: Hearings on S. 2631 Before the Senate Interstate Commerce Com-
mittee, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982) (statement of M. Shapo).
This author is not opposed to federal products legislation but supports the kind
of legislation that will be more direct and focused. The concern is that only problems
which have manifested themselves at a national level be addressed. To do otherwise
would complicate the legislation and make it unwieldly.
A significant factor in the implementation of a federal products law will be the
jurisdictional issue. Senate Bill § 3(d) states: "The district courts of the United States
shall not have jurisdiction over any civil action arising under this Act, based on Sec-
tions 1331 or 1337 of Title 28, United States Code." House Bill § 4(b) also contains a
jurisdiction-barring provision. These sections are in tune with the growing sensitivity
toward the breadth of federal judicial jprisdiction. It guards against expansion of
jurisdiction at a time when bills are being introduced to curtail it. See, e.g., H.R. 6816,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 4465 (1982) (bill to eliminate diversity of citizen-
ship as a basis of jurisdiction of federal district courts); H.R. 2404, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. 4864 (1981) (bill to eliminate diversity of citizenship as a basis of
jurisdiction of federal district courts); S. 675, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. 1980
(1981) (bill to establish Federal Jurisdiction Review and Revision Committee); H.R. 144,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. 34 (1981) (bill to amend Title 28 of the U.S. Code
to limit jurisdiction of courts established by Congress over state cases). Relegating
cases arising under a federal statute to the state courts, however, allows each state to
interpret the law in its own way. That fifty different interpretations of one law deal a
severe blow to uniformity was recognized in Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust, 623
F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980) cert. denied 50 U.S.L.W. 3947 (U.S. June 1, 1982) (No. 80-108).
Additionally, the divergence among state courts can create some novel choice-of-law
situations. For example, where choice-of-law rules call for application of a sister state's
law, the forum state may still be justified in applying its own interpretation of the
federal statute. Thus, though states may continue to differ on the substantive law of
products liability through diverging interpretations of the federal law, the choice-of-
law rules will be circumvented to allow application of forum law. The diversity case,
still within federal jurisdiction under both the Senate and House Bills, would offer the
federal court the opportunity to apply its own interpertation of the federal law, which
could differ from that of any state connected to the case. This would then permit the
accident of diversity to afford a new substantive law to the parties, a situation that
had generally been eliminated by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
[Vol. 18
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Finally, certain aspects of the bills are substantively unfair.
There is a myth that has gained widespread currency in the recent
legislative debate than what is good for consumers is bad for
manufacturers and vice versa. The legislative hearings pit consumer
groups against industry representatives in a highly charged adver-
sary setting.'9 Yet, the reality is that only legislation that is fair,
evenly balanced and easily understood can be of benefit to anyone.
Complex and ponderous legislation will grant no long-term relief to
industry. Legislation that is overly restrictive of legitimate con-
sumer rights will be interpreted out of existence by the courts, who
will refuse to be instruments of injustice. Consumers, on the other
hand, should reap no joy from legislation that will refuse to address
the serious ills which beset the product liability system. It is con-
sumers who finally pay the bill for poorly reasoned decisions, which
penalize the good and bad alike. In the immortal words of Pogo, "We
have met the enemy and he is us."
Instead of the complex labyrinth set forth in the presently pend-
ing bills, five areas of product liability law are deserving of atten-
tion in federal legislation. (1) The return to a negligence standard for
most design defect and failure to warn cases is clearly in order.
Manufacturers legitimately contend that predicating liability on
after-acquired knowledge or yet-to-be developed technology violates
basic standards of fundamental fairness. Thus, the elimination of
strict liability for design and warning cases will establish, at the
national level, a rule which fosters fairness, and, at the same time,
will bring about adherence to an emerging consensus that liability
should be fault-based. 20 (2) A Statute of Repose is necessary to ad-
dress the concern that manufacturers are forced to defend cases of
ancient vintage which create extraordinary logistic problems for the
defense, and which permit juries to bring to bear present day atti-
tudes on safety to products designed and marketed in a long bygone
19. See, e.g., Product Liability: Legislative Hearings on H.R. 5571, H.R. 5258,
H.R. 1061, H.R. 2891, H.R. 4204, H.R. 1675, H.R. 1676, H.R. 2964, and H.R. 5626 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Commission on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 331 (1979) (statement of Barbara
K. Requet, Legislative Director, National Consumer League); id. at 349 (statement of
David Tocker, Consumer Federation of America); id. at 263 (statement of William
Herbert, National Association of Manufacturers); id. at 219 (statement of Charles I.
Den, Senior Vice President, Machinery & Allied Products Institute); id. at 238 (state-
ment of James Mock, Public Affairs Director, National Machine Tool Builders
Association); id. at 569 (statement of Thomas L. Anderson, Bicycle Manufacturers
Association of America).
20. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980); Henderson,
Renewed Judicial Controversy over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preserva-
tion of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1979); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 170-185.
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era."1 (3) There is a necessity for legislation to deal with punitive
damages. Firm and demanding standards should be established for
the imposition of liability which bears the potential of crushing
losses to manufacturers." (4) Legislation should include provisions
mandating comparative fault. In appropriate circumstances
plaintiffs conduct should be considered in a product liability action."
In addition, there is a substantial argument to be made that
some attention should be given to the interrelation between
worker's compensation and product liability recovery against manu-
facturers.2 But if this area is to be addressed, it must be done with
far greater simplicity than that proposed by the present legislative
efforts." Failure to take the least intrusive solution will focus
federal attention on the adequacy of state controlled worker's com-
pensation programs. Although this may be an appropriate legislative
goal, 6 if these two very separate problems are permitted to become
intertwined, it is certain that the very special aspect of the product
liability-worker's compensation interplay will be lost in the thicket.
The thesis of this article is that federal product liability legisla-
tion should be short, simple and highly focused. It should draw from
recognized areas of national consensus for its standards. It should,
at every juncture, take the least intrusive alternative so that it not
upset the traditional role of state courts in controlling tort litiga-
tion.
Rather than undertaking a section-by-section analysis, this dis-
cussion will focus on subject matter categories. An attempt will be
made, wherever possible, to relate sections of the bills to each other
and thus, question not only the isolated provisions, but the internal
consistency of the legislation. Discussion will be directed primarily
to S. 2631 (Kasten) since it is the bill which has received the most
significant attention. Comparisons between the S. 2631 and H.R. 5214
will be noted whenever possible in the margin.
21. See Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension of Products Liability, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 186-195.
22. See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufac-
turers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982); see infra text accompanying
notes 196-203.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 134-145.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 146-161.
25. See Senate Bill §§ 10(a)(1), 11; House Bill § 10; UPLA, supra note 1, §§
111(B)(2), 114 at 62,734-735, 62,740.
26. For a discussion of reforms proposed by the National Commission on State
Workmen's Compensation Law, see LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §
5.30 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See also Symposium on Workmen's Compensation, 53 J. URB.
L. 755 (1976).
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II. STANDARD OF CARE AND PRODUCT QUALITY
A. Construction Defect
Section 5(a) of S. 2631 provides:
A product is unreasonably dangerous in construction if,
when the product left the control of the manufacturer, it
deviated in a material way-
(1) from the design specifications or performance standards
of the manufacturer; or
(2) from otherwise identical units of the same product line.'
In an article commenting on a similar provision in the first draft
of the Uniform Product Liability Law,' this author took the position
that it was unwise to codify the standard for construction defect for
two reasons. First, the adoption of a standard which judges a manu-
facturer by his own, rather than industry standards, could penalize
the manufacturer who goes out of his way to build into his product a
high safety level not mandated or followed by the industry. Con-
sider, for example, a manufacturer of a high quality car who utilizes
the finest grade of steel for springs. Assume that under very ex-
treme conditions (e.g., hitting a large pothole at high speed) a spring
fails and the car goes out of control. If the evidence were to disclose
that the spring that failed did not meet the manufacturer's own in-
ternal construction standards and therefore failed, liability would at-
tach. If the manufacturer's standard far exceeds those of the in-
dustry, it would seem unfair to impose liability merely because a
manufacturer did not mandate quality control standards which
would disclose deviations from his norm, when the product which
came off the assembly line far exceeded the quality of competitive
products. In a society of steadily rising safety standards, this prob-
lem deserves careful attention. We may ill afford simple solutions to
complex problems.'
27. Senate Bill § 5(a).
28. Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the UPLL, supra note 12, at 225-26,
commenting on Draft Uniform Product Liability Law § 104(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 2,996, 2,998
(1979) [hereinafter cited as UPLL].
29. The drafters of the UPLA, in response to this comment, argued:
[Tihis criticism overlooks the fact that the manufacturer's self-imposition of a
higher standard will function as a shield against claims alleging liability in
the more costly area of defective design. By adopting a higher standard, a
manufacturer may occasionally be subject to liability under Subsection (A),
while another manufacturer may not be, but the first manufacturer does not
place its whole product line at risk of being found unreasonably unsafe in
design.
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Second, by imposing a strict liability standard for production de-
fects and a negligence standard for design defects, the proposed leg-
islation aggravates an already difficult situation. In the development
of product safety, there may be several ways to address a safety
hazard. One way may be to increase quality control to assure the in-
tegrity of a crucial part. Another may be to design a back-up safety
feature (a fail-safe component). By deciding that construction defect
cases are not defensible (in that strict liability applies regardless of
fault), and that design defect cases are defensible (on negligence or
risk-utility grounds), the bills have made a conscious decision to
favor the design alternative over quality control. This may be a
short-sighted approach. It is possible that increased safety can be ac-
complished at a lower cost by raising quality control standards,
rather than by designing a fail-safe system that could engender
other risks.
There are some who believe that the problem is overstated and
that the Section 5(a) definition is a good, practical resolution to the
problem of defining construction defect." My own belief is that cases
Not every minor variation from a standard will result in liability;
rather, the variation must be a material one causing the claimant's harm.
In point of fact, there is no practical way to define defective construc-
tion except by the manufacturer's own standards. It is an optimal area for
strict liability "because societal expectations are fairly well established with
regard to such defects, and a ready guage of acceptability exists by reference
to like products that are non-defective." Phillips, "The Standard for Deter-
mining Defectiveness in Products Liability," 46 "U. Cin. L. Rev." 101, 104-05
(1977). Moreover, the imposition of strict liability with regard to defective con-
struction is fair to the product user. Under a negligence system, the claimant
would have the very difficult burden of showing that a manufacturer knew or
should have know about a latent defect in one of thousands of mass-produced
products. UPLA, supra note 1, § 104 Analysis at 62,734.
The most gratifying form of criticism is that which concedes that the substance
of your position is correct. The drafters' difficulty with imposing a negligence system
for construction defects could be alleviated by utilizing the Wade/Keeton risk-utility
test with the benefit of hindsight. See infra note 34. This allows the plaintiff to focus
on the currently available technological information, and relieves him of the burden of
ascertaining the exact state of defendant's knowledge at a specific point in time. It
does, however, ask whether the product which caused the injury was in fact unreason-
ably dangerous (under risk-utility balancing). The drafter's characterization of the
plaintiff's burden as proving a manufacturer's knowledge with regard to "one of
thousands of mass-produced products" is taking their point too far. Our proposal for
risk-utility balancing in construction defect cases would have a claimant focus on the
adequacy, or the presence of a manufacturer's quality-control system and his
knowledge with regard to such quality control, not, as the drafters envision, to
demonstrate knowledge of the actual construction defect in the individual product. For
full explanation of this point see Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting
Perspectives in Products Liability From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 347, 381-83 (1980).
30. See UPLA, supra note 1, § 104 Analysis at 62,723; Henderson, Should A
"Process Defense" Be Recognized in Product Design Cases?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 585,
611-12 (1981).
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will begin surfacing where defendants will argue that the simplistic
definition of construction defect breeds unfairness. It is certainly
strange that in legislation drafted to meet the long range concerns
of manufacturers with regard to liability, this problem has received
scant attention. What is more troubling, however, is the need to ad-
dress the definition of construction defect at all in this legislation.
There is no evidence that the judge-made law with regard to con-
struction defects has been oppressive. Indeed, the argument is that
Section 5(a) merely codifies existing rules. If that is so, then why ad-
dress the problem? The only reason for doing so is that Congress
has seen fit to write a code encompassing the entirety of product lia-
bility law. In doing so, they found it necessary to deal with all
aspects of the product liability action; hence legislation codifying
non-problem areas. If the thrust of legislation would be to legislate
only with regard to clearly perceived national problem areas, there
would be no need to address the construction defect question at all.
The states could be left to their own devices in this area. 31 If de-
veloping case law should reveal that the problems noted above de-
velop, courts will be free to limit the liability of manufacturers in
construction defect cases by imposing a risk-utility standard requir-
ing that the offending product be unreasonably dangerous.2
B. Design Defect
Sections 5(b)-(d) of S. 2631 attempt to establish guidelines for
design defect litigation. These are complex sections that can only be
understood by identifying the interrelationships between the subsec-
tions and by noting how other sections of the bill give meaning to
its provisions.
1. Negligence Rather Than Strict Liability
Section 5(b) of S. 2631 begins with a clear statement that the
standard to be applied in design litigation is one of negligence, not
strict liability. It provides:
A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the
31. To allow room for development of products law by the state courts, the
bill's section preempting the entirety of products law from the states, Senate Bill § 3
and House Bill § 4, should be limited to those areas that are appropriate for federal
preemption. The author later suggests five specific areas to which the federal legisla-
tion should confined. See infra text accompanying notes 166-204.
32. Even if one were to disagree with the proposal that the quality control
process be subject to risk-utility evaluation, see supra note 29, the manufacturer
should at least be able to argue that the actual product which caused injury was in
fact, "reasonably safe" because the product exceeded industry standards and was thus
not defective utilizing a hindsight risk-utility analysis.
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time of manufacture of the product, a reasonably prudent
manufacturer in the same or similar circumstances would not
have used the design that the manufacturer used.'
The clarification on this issue is important. It sets to rest the
raging issue of whether a manufacturer should be held liable for
after-acquired risk information or after-acquired technology. Al-
though there are strong and respectable arguments to be made in
favor of the imputation of knowledge to the manufacturer so that
the plaintiff is relieved of the onerous task of proving what a manu-
facturer could have known or could have done had he used reason-
able care," the reality is that most courts have been unwilling to im-
pose strict liability in design litigation. 35 They simply believe it un-
fair to impose liability upon a manufacturer who has acted in a
reasonably prudent fashion. There is considerable dicta in some
cases that true strict liability will be applied, but when push has
come to shove, most courts have backed off the extreme proposition
that strict liability should apply in design and failure to warn
cases.3' The issue has been thoroughly debated, and the time has
33. Senate Bill § 5(b). See also House Bill § 5(c)(2).
34. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225; Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539; Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical
Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809
(9th Cir. 1974); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
30 (1973); Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
CuM. L. REV. 294 (1979); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
MIss. L.J. 825 (1973). See also Henderson, supra note 21, at "929 n.43.
35. See e.g. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg. Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky.
1973); Balido v. Improved Machinery Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973);
Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Service, 16 Ill. App. 3d 339, 396 N.E.2d 312 (1973).
36. Several recent cases demonstrate that courts are schizophrenic about this
question. In Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) the court
was faced with the question whether it was appropriate to admit evidence of the
feasibility of a safety kill switch on a boat manufactured and sold several years before
the time of trial. It was undisputed that such safety switches became feasible after the
sale of the boat in question. The court, in allowing the defense testimony which focused
on feasibility at the time of manufacture, said:
In cases involving strict liability for defective design, liability is deter-
mined by the product's defective condition; there is no need to prove that the
defendant's conduct was negligent. Considerations such as the utility and
risk of the product in question and the feasibility of safer alternatives are
presented according to the facts as they are proved to be, not according to
the defendant's perceptions. Id at 749.
In Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Il. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980), suit was
brought against the manufacturer of Pitocin (a drug used to induce uterine contrations)
for failing to warn that the drug was contraindicated when the fetus was in high, sta-
tion. The issue on appeal was whether, in an action used on strict liability, plaintiff
must allege and prove that the defendant "knew or should have known" of the danger.
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come to give expression to what appears to be the emerging
national consensus. It is also important to remove the spectre of
fear from the American business community. It is simply unaccept-
able to be told that the law demands from a manufacturer, that
which no reasonable person could be expected to accomplish. At the
extreme, strict liability means that liability attaches for risks that
were unknowable until thirty years after a product was manufac-
tured and for technology not dreamed of at the time a product was
designed. It is time that the issue be laid to rest.
What follows this section, however, is a set of qualifiers that are
extremely troublesome from both substantive and process perspec-
tives.
2. The Sound Support Standard
Section 5(b)(1) of S. 2631 provides:
A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design unless-
In an opinion which defies logical analysis, the court concluded that to "require
knowledge to be alleged and proved" does not "infuse negligence principles into strict
liability." The court said:
We perceive that requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove that the
defendant manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger that caused
the injury, and that the defendant manufacturer failed to warn plaintiff of
that danger, is a reasonable requirement, and one which focuses on the
nature of the product and on the adequacy of the warning, rather than on the
conduct of the manufacturer. The inquiry becomes whether the manufac-
turer, because of the "present state of human knowledge" (Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, sec. 402A, comment k (1965)), knew or should have known of
the danger presented by the use or consumption of a product. Once it is
established that knowledge existed in the industry of the dangerous propen-
sity of the manufacturer's product, then the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant did not warn, in an adequate manner, of the danger. Id. at 198.
See also dissenting opinion, Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059
(Alaska 1980) (Moran, J., dissenting).
These cases are puzzling, in that they appear to adopt a negligence standard
while insisting that they are faithful to strict liability theory. The emphasis in all three
cases, that the focus is on the "state of the art" rather than on the "knowledge of the
particular defendant," is interesting, but hardly earth-shaking. Case law has long
established that a manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert in that particular
industry. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1541 (1956).
Elsewhere, I have suggested that these cases are creating a test of "scientific un-
knowability" as a defense. Thus, the absence of negligence in not knowing may not be
sufficient to absolve the defendant from liability unless the absence of knowledge is at-
tributed to the technological community as a whole. Whatever the appropriate expla-
nation for these cases, it is clear that the cases are seeking to locate a midpoint be-
tween negligence and strict liability. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note
12. See also Henderson, Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Design: A Proposed
Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REV. 625, 634-35 (1978); UPLA, supra note 1, § 104(8)
Analysis at 62,723.
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(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on knowledge which had
sound support in the scientific, technica4 or medical com-
munity for the existence of the danger which caused the
claimant's harm, should have known about the danger which
allegedly caused the claimant's harm .... 37
To predicate liability for design defect by requiring the plaintiff
to establish that the information upon which the manufacturer
should have taken corrective action had "sound support" in the
scientific, technical or medical community is simply wrong. It deni-
grates the role of risk-utility analysis, which is the theoretical base
for the negligence standard which had been codified just one sen-
tence earlier.
Should a manufacturer respond to risks that do not have sound
support in the scientific community? The answer is sometimes yes.
Putting aside for the moment the difficulty of establishing what
standard is to be utilized for judging whether a risk does or does
not have "sound support" in the technical community, it is clear that
there are times when a risk may be remote and very tentatively
based, yet the manufacturer should be required to design or warn
against it. Consider the responsibility of a manufacturer who has
preliminary indications of side effects to an otherwise useful drug or
chemical compound. What if, in risk-utility parlance, the probability
of harm is very low, very remote and not scientifically well estab-
lished. Assume further, that there are alternative methods of manu-
facturing the product that would reduce or eliminate the harm entirely,
or that there are other alternative products which would accomplish
the same goal without the attending harm. Should a manufacturer
be absolved of the responsibility of reformulating the product, or at
the least to warn against a danger' because the scientific data has
37. Senate Bill § 5(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also Senate Bill § 6(b)(1) (failure to
warn). Cf. House Bill § 5(d)(2) ("the manufacturer knew or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have discovered such [danger or safety] information"). Though the author
takes issue with the Senate Bill's "sound support" standard, the bill at least addresses
the issue of a negligence standard with respect to a manufacturer's knowledge and ap-
preciation of the risk. While House Bill § 5(c) is to be commended on its clarity regard-
ing the role of alternative design as an element of plaintiff's case (cf. Senate Bill §
5(b)(2), (d); see infra note 58), the bill is silent on the matter of the manufacturer's neg-
ligence in failing to appreciate the risk. A literal reading of House Bill § 5(c) will
render a manufacturer liable as long as plaintiff demonstrates that a better design
which would have prevented plaintiff's injury was available at the time the manufac-
turer produced the products, even though a reasonable manufacturer may have been
ignorant of the potential harm at that time. It is doubtful that this was the intent of
the drafters of the House Bill; in any event, it is inconsistent with the Bill's standards
for failure to warn in § 5(d)(2), which require a claimant to prove that a manufacturer,
in the exercise of reasonble care, would have discovered the relevant danger or safety
information.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46, 72-73.
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as yet not met the "sound support" standard? And what if the grav-
ity of the potential injury imposed by this not yet scientifically es-
tablished harm is so devistating that a reasonable manufacturer
would take precautions against it? Should the manufacturer be ab-
solved of responsibility from considering the risk because the risk
qua risk is not yet scientifically supportable?
This section appears to be nothing more than the mirror image
of the patent danger rule. Under the patent danger rule, a manufac-
turer was absolved from redesigning his product merely because the
danger was open and obvious.39 The defendant under this rule was
absolved from balancing risk and utility in deciding whether greater
safety was called for in design."° This rule has met with the over-
whelming disapproval of the courts" and is not embodied either in
S. 2631 or H.R. 5214."' Why, then, create a rule which absolves a man-
ufacturer from acting reasonably in obtaining information which
would lead a reasonable person to a risk-reduction decision?
Another troubling aspect of this section is that it appears to set
different standards for a defendant who has knowledge of a risk and
one who does not. The defendant who has knowledge of the danger
might presumably have a duty to make the product safer even
though the risk does not yet have "sound support" in the technical
community. It is only the "should have known" duty which is affec-
ted by the "sound support" rule. Does this mean that a court is auto-
matically to impose liability upon a manufacturer if he knew of a
remote risk that has not yet been established in the scientific com-
munity? If so, the manufacturer is being deprived of a risk-utility
defense when it should clearly be permitted. More serious, however,
is the utter absurdity of creating a more harsh test for a defendant
with knowledge of a risk than one who claims not to have known of
the risk. It puts a premium on ignorance and penalizes a sophisti-
cated manufacturer with good information sources. Hear no evil, see
39. Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush, 427 N.E.2d 1058; Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y.
468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 36, at § 28.5; Twerski,
From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Con-
cepts, 60 MARG. L. REV. 297, 309 (1977).
40. Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and A Survey of its Vitali-
ty, 29 MERCER L. REV. 583, 588-89 (1978).
41. Campo was reversed in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d
571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); accord Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467
P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 3 Wash. App. 508, 476
P.2d 713 (1970); Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 668 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1978); Auburn
Machine Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979); Ulath v. City Tank Corp., 376
Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978). See also Marshall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not
Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1065 (1973); Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of
the Risk for the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1974).
42. See supra note 10.
19821
IDAHO LAW RE VIEW
no evil, is certainly a strange principle to embody in national prod-
ucts legislation.
The imposition of this dual standard is not only theoretically un-
sound, but will also create extraordinary difficulties at the trial
level. The "knew or should have known" standard of tort law is not
a subjective standard. 3 The words are generally uttered in one gulp
and are intended to convey to the jury that a reasonable defendant
should have had the information. What the state of anyone's know-
ledge is at any given moment is very difficult to establish. This is
especially true in cases dealing with risk information or technologi-
cal data. Thus, in tort cases where the issue of information is con-
tested, the plaintiff presents evidence demonstrating the availability
of the knowledge or its potential accessibility to the defendant. The
plaintiff may introduce evidence that traces of the information were
directly available to the defendant. This aids in establishing the
proposition that defendant should have known about the risk. But,
unless there is an attempt to make out an intentional tort or
recklessness, there is no necessity to prove that the defendant sub-
jectively had the risk information. By creating a dual standard, a
premium is now placed on establishing subjective knowledge of the
risk on the part of the defendant-manufacturer, since a defendant
can be held liable for less reliable information (i.e., knowledge
without sound support in the technical community) if he was subjec-
tively aware of it." This will complicate litigation enormously and
become a fertile source for mistaken jury instructions and a
breeding ground for appellate reversals on adequacy of evidence.
Finally, it should be understood that the "sound support" rule is
not self-executing. In every case where the issue of risk data is at
issue, the courts will be called upon to determine how much support
is "sound support." Not only will this spawn countless appeals and
conflicting opinions in state courts, it is bound to do so in a way
which will allow for no rational resolution of the question. When one
asks the question whether risk data has sound support in the scien-
tific, technical or medical community, a multitude of answers could
be forthcoming. Data could be extremely interesting and "sound"
when considered by a researcher for the purpose of whether to run
additional scientific tests, but not "sound" enough to be utilized for
risk-reduction purposes." The opposite may also be true. Risk-infor-
43. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971); but see TERRY, LEADING
PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW § 200 (1884).
44. For an enlightening discussion of the negligible role subjective intent plays
in tort litigation, see Henderson, Process Constraints in Torts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901
(1982).
45. See generally Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 386
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mation, however fragmented, may be significant when considered in
the light of millions of possible exposures to consumers, and yet be
so untrustworthy as not to be given the dignity of scientific fact.
Thus, the "sound support" rule fails because it assumes that technol-
ogy has standards for evaluating risks."' But, that is the task that
the law must face. Law cannot turn to technology to resolve legal
questions.
It should be noted that the "sound support" rule is brought into
play by S. 2631 not only for the design defect cases, but for failure to
warn cases as well. 7 This means that a manufacturer would bear no
responsibility to discover information regarding risks which have
not been scientifically well established, even for the purpose of war-
ning. To state the proposition is to recognize its illogicalness. No one
should be given that kind of carte blanche.
Having leveled the critique, one must acknowledge that the sug-
gested legislation seeks to address a very real problem. There is
genuine concern that courts are permitting cases to go to juries
based on very thin evidence of risk. The problem of judicial control
of jury discretion in design and failure to warn cases is a serious one
that will be addressed later in this paper. However grievous the
(1970); Small, Gaffing at the Thing Called Cause, 31 TEx. L. REV. 630 (1953).
46. It is evident that Senate Bill § 5(b)(1) does not utilize a "reasonableness"
(risk-utility) test in determining whether the manufacturer should have discovered the
danger. The sound support standard is thus not subject to any legal test. It is free
standing. Sec. 5(b) defines a product as unreasonably dangerous in design if "a reason-
ably prudent manufacturer... would not have used the design." The "reasonableness"
requirement for discovery of risk-data is conspicuously absent from Sec. 5(b)(1). If the
authors had intended its adoption they would have inserted it in the formulation set
forth one sentence later.
The requirement of Sec. 5(b)(2) that "a means to eliminate the danger that caused
the harm was within practical technological feasibility" does not mean that risk-utility
balancing has been reintroduced as a modifer of Sec. 5(b)(1). There are several rea-
sons that lead to this conclusion. First, Sec. 5(b)(1) must be established without refer-
ence to "practical technological feasibility" because it is connected with the conjunctive
"and" to Sec. 5(b)(2). One does not proceed to the Sec. 5(b)(2) requirement unless Sec.
5(b)(1) has been met. Second, even the Sec. 5(b)(2) "practical technological feasibility"
standard does not adopt the "reasonableness" test. See. 2(8) which defines "practical
technological feasibility" contains many of the considerations standard to risk-utility
analysis but precludes a plaintiff from establishing that the reason that a design alter-
native was not available to the industry was due to the defendant's negligence in fail-
ing to adequately undertake the work necessary to bring about the technology at an
earlier time. This section comes perilously close to establishing custom as an absolute
defense. On this point the UPLA provides a counterweight to the "practical technolog-
ical feasibility" requirement by taking the position that "custom" is only evidence of
non-negligence but is not binding. UPLA, supra note 1, §§ 107(C), (D) at 62,728.
47. Senate Bill § 6(b)(1).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 57-62, 67-70.
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problem, the solution proposed in S. 2631 simply will not do. It is a
substantive and administrative nightmare.
3. The Unavoidably Dangerous Product
Section 5(c) provides a special exemption for the unavoidably
dangerous product:
A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design if the
harm was caused by an unavoidably dangerous aspect of a
product. As used in this paragraph, an "unavoidably danger-
ous aspect" means that aspect of a product which could not,
in light of knowledge which had sound support in the scien-
tific, technical, or medical community at the time of manufac-
ture, have been eliminated without seriously impairing the
effectiveness with which the product performs its intended
function or the desirability, economic and otherwise, of the
product to the person who uses or consumes it.49
This section is designed to protect the manufacturer from liabil-
ity for technological changes which could not have been accomplished
at the time of manufacture. It is the analogue to the "sound
support" rule for risk data discussed in the previous section. Thus,
it is vulnerable to much of the criticism set forth above. However,
this section, unlike its sister provision, does have a point of legal
reference. It does not speak about the danger without balancing it
against other factors in the negligence formula. It is only "that
aspect of a product which could not, in light of knowledge which had
sound support in the scientific, technical or medical community at
the time of manufacture, have been eliminated without seriously im-
pairing the effectiveness with which the product performs its in-
tended function or the desirability, economic and otherwise, of the
product ....
To appreciate the difficulties with this section, one must begin
with the basic standard of liability set forth in section 5(b), which
provides that a manufacturer is only liable for defective design if at
the time of manufacture a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
not have used that design. The obvious next question is, what does
the "unavoidably dangerous" section add to the liability standard as
already articulated? There are several possible answers. The first is
that it is not intended to add anything at all, but merely to empha-
size the obvious: negligence is the operative standard and "we really
mean it." A good bit of S. 2631 contains that sort of repetition de-
signed to get through to the supposedly thick skulls of the courts
49. Senate Bill § 5(c).
49a. Id.
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that they are to take the negligence standard seriously."0 If that
were the sole interpretive possibility, the section would be compara-
tively harmless. However, courts are not likely to read a statute in
that manner. They are likely to come across the language which en-
joins a court from finding a product defective if the dangerous
aspect of the product could not have been eliminated without "seri-
ously impairing" its effectiveness, or its otherwise desirable fea-
tures. This, then, amounts to something less than a negligence test.
One is not required to utilize even well founded technology if to do
so would seriously impair the usefulness of the product. Since this is
something other than the "reasonableness" standard, it must mean
that the product is exempted from liability, even if the usefulness of
the product is such that it would otherwise not pass the negligence
test, or that other more desirable substitutes are available. The pro-
duct is isolated for special examination and is held to a special stan-
dard, not to be compared or judged against other products in the
field. What possible justification can there be for this exemption?
If there is any doubt that this section establishes a lesser stan-
dard of liability, attention should be directed to Section 2(8), the def-
initional section of S. 2631, which defines the term "practical techno-
logical feasibility" to mean: "the technical and scientific knowledge
relating to the safety of a product which, at the time of manufacture
of a product, was developed, available and capable of use or im-
plementation in the manufacture of a product, and economically
feasible for use by a manufacturer."5 In section 5(d), which estab-
lishes the rules for introducing evidence of alternative design choices,
there is a requirement that all such alternatives meet the test of
practical technological feasibility.2 Section 5(c) clearly establishes a
test for elimination of danger through design alternatives that is less
stringent than that set forth in the "practical technological feasi-
bility" definition.
There is yet another practical question which these sections
leave unanswered. Which products are to be subjected to the lesser
"unavoidably dangerous" standard set forth in section 5(c), and
which will have to meet the "practical technological feasibility" stan-
dard of 5(d)? The answer, of course, is that "unavoidably dangerous"
products will have to meet the 5(c) standard, and regular products
will meet the 5(d) standard. However, that is bound to lead us to a
50. For example, Senate Bill § 5(b) establishes liability only if at the time of
manufacture a reasonable prudent manufacturer would not have utilized the chosen
design. This is followed by Sec. 5(b)(1) which establishes the "sound support" rule for
knowledge and Sec. 5(b)(2) which establishes the "practical technological feasibility"
rule. Sec. 5(d)(2) then expects the self-same requirements when discussing the admissa-
bility of evidence for alternative designs.
51. Senate Bill § 2(8).
52. Senate Bill §§ 5(b)(2), 5(d)(2)(A).
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perfectly circular reasoning unless there is a preconceived definition
of "unavoidably dangerous" products. Since the Senate Bill defines
the category in terms of the liability test and not in terms of a pre-
conceived definition, there is no way to break the circle.
Finally, if one were inclined to create a definition of unavoidable
danger, the endeavor would be a fruitless one. Admittedly there are
dangers that are unavoidable, such as the risk of an allergic reaction
to penicillin, but, there is no need to create a special category to ab-
solve penicillin from liability. Given the reasonableness standard,
penicillin is simply not unreasonably dangerous. 3 Its benefits far
outweigh its known risks. It may be necessary from time to time to
warn consumers about unavoidable risks, but section 5(c) does not
address the failure to warn question, only design defect. Section 6 of
S. 2631, which deals with failure to warn, does not, nor could it in
good conscience, take the position that there is no duty to inform
consumers about unavoidably dangerous aspects of a product. Thus,
the so-called "unavoidably dangerous" product is either reasonably
designed or one whose danger has been adequately warned against.
Only wholesale confusion can be wrought by embodying the improvi-
dent Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A(k) into national leg-
islation.14 It is either wrong or unnecessary. The greater likelihood
is that it will not be treated as surplusage and will thus involve the
courts in trying to place certain products in either one or the other
category. Since the Senate Bill offers no definition, and since no
logical one appears available, the courts will be off on a fool's errand.
This section should be excised from the bill.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(k) states that:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowl-
edge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding exam-
ple is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since
the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoid-
ably high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly pre-
pared and accompanied by proper directions and warning is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. Id (emphasis in original).
The author has always been puzzled as to why the rabies vaccine case is used as
an example of an "unavoidably unsafe" product when the Restatement makes it clear
that the rabies vaccine is simply not "unreasonably dangerous."
54. Id The RESTATEMENT further provides that in the case of new and ex-
perimental drugs the seller is not to be held to strict liability if the product was "prop-
erly prepared and marketed . . . merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but ap-
parently reasonable risk." Id. at § 402A comment k.
This section is very troubling. The problem with new and experimental drugs is
that they are attended with "unknown" rather than "known" risks. How then can the
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4. The Standards for Alternative Designs
The negligence standard normally requires that a plaintiff sug-
gest alternative safety features which would have prevented the plain-
tiff's injury. Both S. 2631 and H.R. 5214 address the standards plain-
tiffs must meet in establishing the viability of the alternative de-
sign. Section 5(d) of S. 2631 provides:
If an alternative design is offered as evidence that a prod-
uct was unreasonably dangerous in design, a product is not
unreasonably dangerous in design unless the claimant estab-
lishes that, at the time of the manufacture of the product-
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on sound support in the
scientific, technical, or medical community for the existence
of the alternative design, should have known about the alter-
native design; and
(2) the alternative design would have-
(A) utilized only science and technology for which there
was sound, scientific, technical, or medical support and which
was within practical and technological feasibility;
(B) provided better safety with regard to the particular
hazard which caused the claimant's harm and equivalent or
better overall safety than the chosen design. The overall
safety of the alternative design is better than the chosen
design if the hazards it eliminates are greater than any new
hazards it creates for any persons and for any uses;
(C) been desirable, functionally, economically, and other-
wise, to the person who uses or consumes it."
These are very complex sections that will require considerable
interpretation to give meaning to heretofore undefined terms." Be-
drug have been properly marketed with advertance to the "known" risk? If the risk is
known and warned against, then the product is not unreasonably dangerous. If it is not
known, it can hardly be marketed so as to warn against the unknown risk. If the RE-
STATEMENT wished to exempt drugs from strict liability it should have said that all de-
fective design and failure to warn drug cases are to be subject to the negligence stan-
dard.
55. Senate Bill § 5(d).
56. House Bill § 5(c).
57. Senate Bill § 5(d) (emphasis added).
58. There is considerable confusion created by two sections that appear to
speak to the same issue, but have language that differ substantially. Senate Bill § 5(b)(2)
requires that for a product to be unreasonably dangerous in design "a means to elimi-
nate the danger that caused the harm was within practical technological feasibility."
This would mean the plaintiff must establish an alternative design defect case. Yet
See. 5(d) begins by stating "[i]f an alternative design is offered in evidence .. " If Sec.
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fore subjecting them to scrutiny, it behooves us to understand why
they have found their way into the Senate Bill. Why were the
drafters not simply satisfied with a basic negligence definition based
on risk-utility principles in design defect litigation, which clearly
limited responsibility to risk-data and technology available at the
time of manufacture? Arguably, the drafters were seeking to iden-
tify standards for risk-utility litigation which would permit courts to
direct verdicts in close-call design defect cases where the evidence
on defect is, at the very best, marginal. 9 As noted earlier, there is
very real concern that cases are going to juries based on very thin
evidence of defect. The policy implications of such cases are enor-
mous. In design defect cases, defendant manufacturers are exposed
to liability for every unit of a product which is in the market. °
Courts should treat these cases with great care. The rule of thumb
in run of the mill negligence litigation is when in doubt "send it to
the jury." A directed verdict in a negligence case is a rare phenome-
non. The societal implications of allowing the occasional slip and fall
or fender-bender cases to go to a jury on thin evidence is not signifi-
cant. But, to permit close-call design defect cases based on thin
evidence to routinely go to juries could be disastrous to a sophisti-
cated business community. 1 This is especially true if design safety
review committees, which evaluate in-house safety standards, docu-
ment their decisionmaking process. Evidence of their evaluative pro-
cess, which demonstrates close-call decisionmaking, would damn the
manufacturer in the eyes of a jury.' Their only protection lies with
a judiciary that is prepared to direct verdicts in cases where the
evidence is too weak to legitimately sustain a prima facie case.
5(b)(2) is to be followed, there is no "if' about whether it will or will not be offered into
evidence. A choice between the two approaches must be made.
It appears somewhat strange that Sec. 5(b)(2), which sets the liability standard
for alternative design, is less demanding than Sec. 5(d), the evidentiary standard. For
example, Sec. 5(b)(2) speaks only to "practical technological feasibility" whereas Sec.
5(d)(2)(A) and (B) contains an entire litany as to minimum standards for design defect.
There is a very real question as to whether See. 5(d)(2)(A), which provides that a
preferred alternative design would have "utilized only science and technology for
which there was sound scientific, technical or medical support and which was within
practical and technological feasibility," is the equivalent of Sec. 2(8). Since it utilizes its
own definition for feasibility and does not use the statutory term "practical technolog-
ical feasibility," it may not trigger the Sec. 2(8) standard. The term "practical and tech-
nological feasibility" would seem to stand on its own and may be taken not to refer to
Sec. 2(8). The difference between the requirements of Sec. 5(d)(2) and See. 2(8) are
marked. Sec. 5(d)(2) does iot require, as does Sec. 2(8), that the alternative be "devel-
oped, available and capable of use or implementation in the manufacture of a product."
59. See generally, Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 29, at
374-80 and Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher, & Piehler, In Defense of Process, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 616, 617 (1980).
60. See UPLA supra note 1, § 104 Analysis at 62,722.
61. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 12.
62. Henderson, supra note 30, at 606-11; Owen, supra note 22, at 15.
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The solution to this problem, proposed by S. 2631 and H.R. 5214,
is to create substantive standards to define the kinds of cases that
may legitimately go to a jury. Although the goals that these sec-
tions seek to foster are admirable, it is simply not possible to write
limiting standards for risk-utility litigation without affecting the
liability standard in an undesirable fashion. Consider, for example,
the requirement that an alternative design provide:
better safety with regard to the particular hazard which
caused the claimant's harm and equivalent or better overall
safety than the chosen degign. The overall safety of the
alternative design is better than the chosen design if the
hazards it eliminates are greater than any new hazards it
creates for any person and for any uses. 3
Note that the initial standard suggests that the alternative
design provide "equivalent or better overall safety." The next
sentence goes on to define "better overall safety." The term
"equivalent safety" is never explained. Since the test for admissibil-
ity is fulfilled by the lower "equivalence" standard, one would have
expected that it would be defined. Perhaps this is easily explained.
Since, if better safety is provided for the particular hazard that
caused the harm and all other safety aspects of the product remain
constant, then the alternative design is clearly superior. However,
as the next sentence demonstrates, that is not the only possibility.
If a product creates Risks A, B & C, an alternative safety feature
may eliminate risk A entirely, increase the probable risk of B, but
reduce the severity of risk C. In a risk-utility calculus, the over-all
qualitative risk of harm of the suggested alternative might be
equivalent even though new risks are brought into play.
Turning to the definition of "better overall safety," we find that
an alternative is better if "the hazards it eliminates are greater
than any new hazard it creates for any person and for any uses."
The heart of risk-utility analysis is a balance of the probability of
harm, gravity of harm and burden of precaution against the harm."
A suggested design alternative might eliminate one very significant
hazard of a serious nature but increase the probability of several
lesser hazards. The trade-offs might still clearly militate in favor of
the design change but not meet the statutory standard. There is no
assurance that the word "greater" will be defined in a qualitative
(risk-utility) sense rather than in a quantitative (absolute risk) sense.
In fact, the language which follows the standard suggests a quan-
63. Senate Bill § 5(d)(2)(B).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292-94; Micallef v. The Miehle Co., 39
N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571; Wilson v. Piper Aircraft, 282 Or. 61, 577
P.2d 1322 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N. J. 150, 406 A.2d
140 (1979).
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titative reading since it speaks of new hazards created "for any per-
sons and for any uses." This is a strange requirement if the intent of
the drafters was to balance risk and gravity, since it is certainly
possible that for improbable users and uses the risk would be
greater, but the remoteness of such events would lead one to dis-
count them in evaluating the overall good of the alternative design."5
Finally, the requirement that the alternative design be
"desirable functionally, economically and otherwise, to the person
who uses or consumes it" creates real problems in administering the
risk-utility standard. If the statutory standard requires that the
alternative design be just "as desirable" as the chosen design and
that there would be no sacrifice of either function or economy to ac-
complish safety, this would cripple legitimate and well-founded
design defect litigation. It is a rare safety device that imposes no
costs. However, if that is not the intent, then we are left with an
unstructured requirement that the product with the alternative safe-
ty device be "desirable." This requirement is at the same time too
broad and too narrow. Without risk-utility balancing, how is one to
tell whether the "desirability" criterion has been met?"6 At some
65. If the language of this section were to more closely approximate the risk as-
pect of risk-utility analysis it should read as follows: "The overall safety of the alterna-
tive design is better than the chosen design if the frequency and severity of all the
hazards it eliminates are greater than the frequency and severity of all new hazards it
creates." This proferred formulation, still falls short of the mark. Frequency and sever-
ity of injury are to be factored together to determine risk potential. It is probably for
this reason that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 lists factors to be con-
sidered together rather than attempting to formulate a rule since risk is more ac-
curately expressed as the product of risk and gravity.
66. In risk-utility parlance, the "desirability" of a product goes to its utility.
Thus, in weighing the probability and gravity of harm it must be balanced against its
desirability. The question is not whether a particular product is desirable on an abso-
lute scale, but rather whether some desirable features of the product are worth trad-
ing off against safety. Again, as noted earlier, the problem arises because Sec.
5(d)(2)(A), (B) and (C) are connected with the conjunction "and." This means that each
item must be separately established in order to make out a prima facie case. See supra
note 46.
The House Bill attempts to create more definitive standards by isolating each of
the factors for separate attention. House Bill §§ 5(c)(3)(A), (B) and (C) provide:
An alternative design shall be considered better than the manufacturer's
chosen design if the alternative design-
A . was significantly safer than the chosen design. The alternative design
was safer than the chosen design if the alternative design would have
provided both-
(i) better safety than that of the chosen design as to the particular
hazard which allegedly caused the claimant's harm; and
(ii) better overall safety than that of the chosen design. The overall
safety of the alternative design is better if the hazards it eliminates
are greater than any new hazards it creates for any person and for
any uses;
B . was not more expensive than the chosen design, unless the added safety
[Vol. 18
PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATION
level even products with severely reduced performance capability
are desirable. Surely that is not the standard that this bill seeks to
accomplish. We are thus forced to revert to a desirability standard
equivalent to the chosen design, or one that is not defined at all and
left to the pure discretion of the trial judge. The former, as noted,
would destroy design litigation; the latter is unintelligible.
It is not the purpose of this critique to suggest that the drafters
have acted in bad faith or were tilting with windmills. It is clear
that they were attempting to place sensible limitations on risk-
utility analysis and provide guidance for courts so that courts could
more effectively administer the standard. But, ultimately the at-
tempt to do so by creating substantive limitations must fail. Risk-
utility balancing requires that a multitude of factors be considered
and weighed. One cannot separate out individual factors and remove
them from the balancing process without impairing the entire
endeavor.
What then is the answer? Are we to be left to unchecked jury
discretion in all cases? There are rational alternatives worthy of
consideration. In an article, entitled Seizing the Middle Ground Be-
tween Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing
Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts,7 it is suggested that
directed verdict practice could be enhanced and encouraged by
focusing on a broad range of policy considerations that speak to the
wisdom of judicial intervention in the complex question of product
benefits of the alternative design were significantly greater than the
added expense;
C . was not less useful or desirable than the chosen design, unless the add-
ed safety benefits of the alternative design were significantly greater
than the losses of usefullness or desirability;
By providing that the alternative design must be significantly safer and that its
added safety benefits be significantly greater than the loss of usefulness or desirability
of the chosen design, the bill establishes an enormously high barrier to recover. It is
possible that an alternative design would be significantly safer than the chosen design,
and that the added safety beneifts would be significantly greater than the loss of use-
fulness of the chosen design, but that the added cost would be greater, but not signif-
icantly greater, than the added safety benefits. In such a case, plaintiff would not
recover because he has not made out the significantly greater requirement for each of
the three elements. Furthermore, to weigh some but not all of the risk-utility factors
in See. 5(c)(3)(A), (B) and (C) skews the balance. Thus, for example, in See. 5(c)(3)(B),
safety and cost are weighed, but not utility.
It is interesting to note that the "significantly greater" language has its origin in
the precursor to the Senate Bill. H.R. 5626 § 5(b)(3), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REc. 9332 (1979). H.R. 5626 reflected risk-utility analysis more accurately, and provided
that when all the factors are considered together, the safety factor significantly
outweighs the increased cost and decreased utility. For a discussion and critique of
H.R. 5626 § 5(b)(3) standard see Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, In Defense of
Process, supra note 59, at 617.
67. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 12.
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design. These factors when considered together will often lead to
the conclusion that product redesign by the judiciary is extremely
unwise. A statutory framework that would call judicial attention to
these policies could be helpful in curbing improvident design defect
cases.
68
Another approach might be to address the evidentiary standard
rather than the liability standard by requiring that courts find that
the risk-utility case is well established. There has been considerable
reluctance to establish the "clear and convincing standard" which is
as demanding as the minimum standard for jury submission in
design defect cases.6 9 It should be remembered that what is being
sought is not a mere verbalization, but a tool to place additional con-
trol in the hands of trial and appellate judges to prevent ill-founded
cases from going to the jury. Perhaps the formulation of a new
evidentiary standard, "clear preponderance of the evidence," which
places the burden halfway between the "preponderance test" and
the fraud "clear and convincing" standard, strikes the correct
balance. It would send a message to the courts that design cases
must be founded on solid evidence before they are given over to the
vagaries of jury discretion.
The following formulation for a statute was suggested half in
jest in an earlier writing.
We have strong suspicions that some awfully weak pro-
duct liability cases are being sustained by trial and appellate
courts. Given the serious dislocation to the industrial com-
munity and the skyrocketing effect on product costs, we
believe that the time has come to assure ourselves that only
the clearest kinds of design defect and failure to warn cases
should be sustained. This Act empowers trial and appellate
judges to do what they should have been doing in the first
68. A listing of such factors is not inappropriate for legislation and may provide
guidance to the courts. See e.g., UPLA, supra note 1, §§ 104(B)(2)(a)-(e) at 62,721; ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2805 (1979).
69. Sec. 106 and 107 of the UPLL provided for a presumption of non-defective-
ness when a product conformed to the "state of the art" or conformed to legislative or
administrative standards. These presumptions could be rebutted by the claimant by
"clear and convincing evidence that the product was defective." UPLL, supra note 28,
§ 106 at 2,998-2,999. The UPLA, which was finally promulgated by the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, backed away from the "clear and convincing" test in both areas. With re-
gard to state of art, Sec. 106 of the UPLL was replaced by Sec. 107, which places the
burden on the defendant to establish that the product met "practical technological
feasibility." UPLA, supra note 1, § 107 at 62,728. Sec. 107 of the UPLL was replaced
by Sec. 108(A), which permits the claimant to rebut the presumption of non-defective-
ness by "a preponderance of the evidence." Id § 108(A) at 62,730. It would appear that
this was in response to arguments of consumer groups that a "clear and convincing
standard" was much too onerous.
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place. Verdicts should be directed unless you are convinced
that a bona fide case of defect has been established.0
The language is inelegant and not appropriate for statutory enact-
ment, but it does express the sentiments of those disenchanted with
the present situation accurately. It should be possible to draft
language that expresses the sense of Congress without creating a
comprehensive legislative scheme which imposes artificial restraints
and limitations on the risk-utility balancing process.
5. Failure to Warn
The failure to warn sections include rules dealing with stan-
dards for warnings, cause-in-fact and intervening cause. The focus in
this section will be on the substantive duty to warn. Discussion of
the causation aspects will, for the main, be left for another section
of this paper.
Section 6(b) of S. 2631 provides:
A product is unreasonably dangerous for lack of
necessary warnings or instructions if the claimant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time the product was sold-
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on "sound support" in
the scientific, technical, or medical community for the ex-
istence of the danger which caused the claimant's harm,
should have known about the danger which allegedly caused
the claimant's harm;
(2) the manufacturer failed to provide the warnings or in-
structions that a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the
same or similar circumstances would have provided with
respect to the danger which caused the harm alleged by the
claimant, given the likelihood that the product would cause
harm of the type alleged by the claimant and given the
seriousness of that harm;
(3) the manufacturer failed to provide to the claimant or to
another person in accordance with subsection (d)(1) such
warnings or instructions which the claimant alleges would
have been adequate .... "
In an earlier discussion I indicated that the "sound support"
standard embodied in Section 6(b) was improper for the design
defect standard"2 and a fortiori-wrong for the failure to warn stan-
70. Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the UPLL, supra note 12, at 233.
71. Senate Bill § 6(b) (emphasis added).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 37-48.
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dard. The discussion need not be repeated at this point. There is a
need, however, to address the requirements set forth in Sections
6(b)(1) and (2) that the manufacturer should have known about "the
danger which allegedly caused the claimant's harm" and that the
manufacturer failed to provide warnings with "respect to the danger
which caused the harm alleged by the claimant." These provisions
could absolve manufacturers from liability for conduct which fair-
minded persons would agree should not be immunized. Consider a
drug or chemical manufacturer that fails to warn that side effects of
cancer of the liver have been reported in conjunction with the use of
the product. Later there is evidence that not only is cancer of the
liver implicated with product use but testicular cancer as well.
Should a manufacturer that has failed to warn about side effects
which implicated cancer be absolved from liability because the
specific form of cancer, which the plaintiff suffered was not
discovered or sufficiently established to require warning?73 This is
especially unfair when the function of the warning was to permit the
plaintiff an "informed choice" as to whether to use the product.74
There are other substantive provisions which appear equally un-
fair. Section 6(d)(2) of S.2631 provides:
A product is not unreasonably dangerous for lack of
warnings or instructions regarding-
(A) dangers that are obvious. As used in this clause,
"dangers that are obvious" are those of which a reasonably
prudent product user or a person identified in subsection
(d)(1), if applicable, would have been aware without a warn-
ing or instruction and dangers which were a matter of com-
mon knowledge to persons in the same or similar position as
the claimant;
(B) the consequences of product misuse, as defined in section
10(a)(2), or use contrary to warnings or instructions available
to the user or to a person identified in subsection (d)(1), if ap-
plicable; or
(C) alterations or modifications, as defined in section 10(b)(2),
of the product which do not constitute reasonably an-
73. This issue would usually be subsumed in a proximate cause analysis. The
general rule is that a defendant is not absolved from liability if the plaintiff was fore-
seeable and the general category of harm was foreseeable and the only unforeseeable
element is the manner in which the harm was brought about. PROSSER, supra note 43.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. See also Twerski, supra note 41,
at 517-46; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Product Liability -Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
495, 517-521 (1976). Senate Bill § 6(b)(4) seems to recognize the "informed consent" type
of warning by noting that a warning may lead the consumer to decline to use the prod-
uct.
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ticipated conduct on the part of the product user.7 5
Section 6(2)(A) absolves a manufacturer for failure to warn of ob-
vious dangers. Although, in general, courts have absolved manufac-
turers from liability in these kinds of cases,"6 it would be unwise to
freeze this concept into statutory language. For example, the
manufacturer of iodine of some other poisonous household chemical
would be freed from the obligation of placing a "poison" label on the
bottle since the danger is a matter of "common knowledge to per-
sons in the same or similar position" of the claimant. The function of
a warning is often to bring to the claimant's attention the most ob-
vious of dangers so that the inadvertant mistake of reaching for the
wrong bottle does not take place. A blanket provision immunizing
defendants for failure to warn for obvious danger paints with too
broad a brush.
Section 6(2)(B) and (C) must be read with section 10(a)(2) to
understand their import. Section 10(a)(2) of S. 2631 provides:
(2) For purposes of this Act, misuse shall be considered to occur
when a product is used for a purpose or in a manner which is not
consistent with the warnings or instructions available to the
user, or which is not consistent with reasonable practice of users
of the product, or when a product user fails adequately to train
its employee in the safe use of the product, or otherwise provide
for the safe use of the product, and the lack of training or the
failure otherwise to provide for the safe use of the product was a
cause of the claimant's harm."
The meaning of these sections is not clear. If the warning was
adequate in the first place then the product is not unreasonably
dangerous. The claimant will simply not have met requirements as
set forth in Section 6(b) for a prima facie case. One must then
assume that for the purposes of Section 6(2)(B) we are dealing with
an inadequate warning or instruction, i.e. one that failed to warn
with sufficient clarity as to the danger involved. One now turns to
section 10(a)(2) and discovers that if a product is misused in that it
was used in a manner not consistent with presumably inadequate
warnings, then liability is totally barred. This is so because section
10(a)(2) is to be related back to Section 6 which negates recovery en-
tirely, and not to Section 10(a)(1) which reduces the claimant's
recovery to the extent which the misuse was a cause of the harm.
75. Senate Bill § 6(d)(2). The analogue in the House Bill is §§ 5(c)(4)(A), (B),
5(d)(3)(A).
76. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.) cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133
Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976); Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230, N.E.2d 182 (1967).
77. Senate Bill § 10(a)(2).
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There is another and perhaps more plausible interpretation to
be given to Section 6(2)(B) and that is that the statute seeks to ab-
solve the manufacturer from warning with regard to product
misuse. With regard to first part of the definition set forth Section
10(a)(2), the statute sets no standards at all since it provides that if its
use was not consistent with warning or instructions available to the
user, that liability will not attach. But, the very question before us
is whether the warnings with regard to misuse should have been
available. At the very best, this part of the statute is circular when
relating it back to Section 6(2)(B). The second part of Section 10(a)(2),
which defines misuse as one which "is not consistent with
reasonable practice of users of the product," can be related back to
section 6 in a way which does not foster illogic. This time it will
foster injustice. This section would mandate that a manufacturer has
no responsibility to warn about possible forseeable misuses-the
very kind of misuses which Section 10(a)(1) provides should only
reduce, not eliminate, a plaintiffs recovery.
A similar critique must be leveled at the alteration-modifica-
tion section set forth in Section 10(b)(2):
(2) For purposes of this Act, alteration or modification shall
be considered to occur-
(A) when a person other than the manufacturer or pro-
duct seller changes the design, construction, or formula of
the product, or changes or removes warnings, instructions,
or safety devices that accompanied or were displayed on the
product; or
(B) when a product user fails to observe the routine care
and maintenance necessary for a product and that failure
was the cause of the claimant's harm.
(3) Ordinary wear and tear of a product shall not be con-
sidered to be alteration or modification of a product under
this subsection.
78
To make sense out of these sections one must assume that Sec-
tion 6(2)(C) means to say that there is no duty to warn against pro-
duct alteration. Does that mean if inadequate instructions were
altered or tampered with, the defendant would be absolved of liabil-
ity? Continuing the analogy with the misuse section, why is there no
duty ever to warn about alterations which do not "constitute
reasonably anticipated conduct"? The answer would appear to be
that one should not be required to warn about unforseeable altera-
tions. This proposition is certainly defensible, but the act does not
define "reasonably anticipated conduct" in the context of forseeabil-
78. Senate Bill § 10(b)(2).
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ity. One must look to Section 2(13) to discover that "reasonably an-
ticipated conduct" is defined to mean "conduct which would be ex-
pected of a reasonably prudent person who is likely to use the prod-
uct in the same or similar circumstances." 9 The problem is that
alterations are sometimes performed by some. persons who cannot
be characterized as "reasonably prudent," but whose conduct may
be quite forseeable. Section 6(2)(C) absolves the manufacturer totally
from the responsibility of warning against such alterations. It does
not merely reduce the manufacturer's contribution to the percen-
tage of his fault as provided in Section 10(b)(1).
The drafters have either not fully understood what they have
wrought or they have sought to unfairly limit liability. Again, the
complexity of these sections is bound to take a heavy toll on the
fair administration of a products liability system. They are certain
to cause massive confusion when subjected to the crucible of the
trial theatre.
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The role of expert testimony in product liability litigation has
received considerable attention over the past decade."' Manufac-
turers have expressed concern that cases are permitted to go to
juries based on expert opinion that is marginally credible at the
very best. 1 One of the factors which a court should consider in
deciding whether to grant a directed verdict is the quality and
strength of the expert opinion.2 This is especially true in polycen-
tric design defect litigation.2 Expert opinion should not pass muster
by the mere say-so of the witness. The court must realize that im-
79. Senate Bill § 2(13).
80. See UPLL, supra note 28, § 117 Analysis at 3016-17; Donaher, Piehler,
Twerski & Weinstein The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52
TEX. L. REV. 1303 (1974); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability:
An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DUG. L. REV. 425 (1974).
81. O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology, Prac-
tice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627, 628 (1978).
82. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 12 at 521.
83. Professor Henderson has identified design defect litigation as polycentric.
He explains that:
[Plolycentric problems are many centered problems, in which each point for
decision is related to all the others as are the strands of a spider web. If one
strand is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur throughout
the entire web. If another strand is pulled the relationship among all the
strands will again be readjusted. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufac-
turers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 1531, 1536 (1973).
Utilizing this definition, Professor Henderson argues that the balancing of cost, safety,
esthetics, utility and productivity almost inevitably leads to polycentric decisonmaking.
Id. at 1539-42.
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portant policy is being made in these cases and subject the expert
testimony to significant scrutiny.
S. 2631 attempts to resolve this problem, which requires the deft
skill of a surgeon, by presenting to the trial judge a tool that has all
the sophistication of a butcher's mean axe.
Section 4(b) of S. 2631 provides:
The claimant must introduce sufficient evidence to allow
a reasonable person, by a preponderance of the evidence, to
make the determinations specified in subsection (a). Expert
opinion is not considered sufficient evidence to support a
proposition of fact unless it is supported or corroborated by
sound objective evidence.8"
One knowledgeable observor has labelled this section "the build
your own damn car" rule for design litigation. The characterization,
though a bit overdone, is essentially accurate. In order to make out
a design defect case, a plaintiff must corroborate the expert's opin-
ion by "sound objective evidence." This means that a plaintiff will
be required to demonstrate the workability of an alternative design
by demonstrating through actual testing that the alternative will
meet practicability standards. The cost of such testing could be pro-
hibitive. It would literally destroy the low budget design defect
cases where damages are modest, and will not permit the production
of a mock-up alternative model which would be subjected to testing.
Indeed, it would discourage even the high budget case since the
mock-up and testing might require the expenditure of huge sums of
money which could be recouped only if there were a sizable
recovery. This requirement is an inexorable one. It will not give
way if plaintiff were able to produce five of the most reputable ex-
perts in the country to testify that the design was defective. Ex-
perts by definition are not "sound objective evidence." 5
Furthermore, who is to determine how much evidence con-
stitutes "sound objective evidence"? Will it be the mock-up or the
mock-up plus testing? Will it require testing over prolonged periods
of time so that maintenance, repair and wear are tested under ac-
tual use conditions? These and similar questions will plague ap-
pellate courts for decades. Interpretations will vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. One can be certain that almost every design
case that is litigated will face the challenge from the defendant that
Section 4(b) has not been met. Discord and lack of uniformity through-
84. Senate Bill § 4(b).
85. Even more astounding is that by requiring "sound objective evidence,"
plaintiffs will be required to supply the supporting data even if the plaintiffs expert
testimony is uncontested.
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out the country will be certain to result. Only the lawyers will profit
from the countless appeals and retrials that are sue to follow.
It should be noted that the issue of design defect is not the only
issue to be affected by Section 4(b). By its terms, it applies to every
aspect of the prima facie case to which expert testimony is neces-
sary, Thus, the issue of cause-in-fact, to which experts must con-
stantly testify, would be subject to the corrobation rule as well. I
am mystified as to how but-for causation will be corrobated by "sound
objective evidence." Since this aspect of the case depends on a hypo-
thetical replay of the accident situation absent the design defect but
with the new alternative design hypothetically in place,8 it would
require some replay of the events under accident conditions. Unless
volunteer kamikazi pilots are to be located to indulge in. such test-
ing, there is unlikely to be sound objective evidence to corroborate
this aspect of the case. From time immemorial, causation has de-
pended on the art form of the expert, Whose opinion has been sub-
ject to the test of cross-examination. The requirement of sound ob-
jective evidence to corroborate is wildly unrealistic.
The problem which this section seeks to address is a real one.
There is a need to ask courts to subject expert testimony to more
rigorous standards and not to permit cases based on the pure mus-
ings of an expert to support a jury finding for liability. Perhaps the
standard which was suggested earlier, requiring all issues to be sup-
ported by "clear preponderance of the evidence," might be helpful.
Section 4(b) as written is substantively unfair and administratively
unworkable. It should not find its way into national product liability
legislation.
IV. THE CAUSE-IN-FACT ISSUE
There are two cause-in-fact issues which surface with consider-
able regularity in product liability cases. The first asks whether de-
fendant's product was implicated in the injury event. 7 The second
asks whether the defect caused the harm." The pending legislation
seeks to address both of these questions. Given the nature of the
legislation, which seeks to enact a comprehensive product liability
86. See generally PROSSER, supra note 43, § 103 at 671-72. Courts have
acknowledged that cause-in-fact in product liability cases requires that plaintiff
establish that but-for the defect, the injury would not have occurred. Midwestern V.W.
Corp. v. Ringley, 503 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1973); Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs, 480
S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp. 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Self v. General Motors, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr.
575 (1974).
87. 1 HURSH & BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.41 at 125 (2d
ed. 1974); PROSSER, supra note 43, § 103 at 671-72.
88. See supra note 86.
19821
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
bill speaking to every aspect of product liability law, it could hardly
avoid the issue of causation. As noted earlier, legislation that would
direct itself to clearly perceived national problems could avoid ad-
dressing many problems for which no legislative solution is available
or desirable.
A. Defendant Identification
Section 4(a)(2) of S. 2631 first addresses the cause issue by requir-
ing that in order for a claimant to establish liability against a manu-
facturer, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the individual product unit, which allegedly caused the
harm complained of, was manufactured by the defendant. 9
This section is designed to overrule Sindell v. Abbott Laborator-
ies." In this now famous case, the California Supreme Court held
that manufacturers of DES would be held liable to "market share
liability" if plaintiff could not establish which pharmaceutical com-
panies' pill was ingested by the plaintiff's mother many years be-
fore. DES is alleged to cause cancer in the reproductive organs of
offspring. These injuries did not manifest themselves until many
years after the drugs were prescribed and ingested. Later, when the
offspring sought to bring suit against the drug manufacturers, they
were faced with the practical problem of establishing which drug
company had manufactured the DES ingested by the mother. The
Sindell case has been the subject of extensive comment. It is not
surprising that the case has received mixed reviews."
89. Senate Bill § 4(a)(2). The analogue in the House Bill is § 5(a)(1)(C). The House
bill has no saving provision analogous to Senate Bill § 4(c).
90. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
91. The SindeU decision was praised in Note, Market Share Liability: A New
Method of Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants, 30 CATH. L. REV. 551 (1981); Note, Market
Share Liability: An Answer to the D.E.S. Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668
(1981); Case Comment, 57 N.D. L. REV. 81 (1981); Comment, California Expands Tort
Liability under the Novel "Market Share" Theory: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 8
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1101 (1981). The decision was not approved of in Note, Beyond
Enterprise Liability in D.E.S. Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REV. 695 (1981); Note, Market
Share Liability for D.E.S. (DiethylstilbestrolU Injury: A New High Water Mark in
Tort Law, 60 NEB. L. REV. 432 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability-The California
Roulette of Causation Eliminating the Identification Requirement, 11 SETON HALL L.
REV. 610 (1981); Note, Manufacturers' Liability Based on a Market Share Theory:
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 16 TULSA L. J. 286 (1980).
Case law has also been sharply divided. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville, 509 F.
Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (supporting Sindell); Ryan.v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp.
1004 (D.S.C. 1981) (disapproving of Sindell); Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337
(S.D. tex. 1978) (disapproving of Sindell). See also Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386
Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (the court may adopt a market-share theory in some
situations). Other courts have applied alternate theories in Sindell-type situations. See,
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The legislative attempt to override Sindell is unfortunate. First,
it paints with extremely broad strokes and includes in its sweep,
cases which the drafters did not consider, and which I am certain no
one is prepared to overrule. Second, the provision seeking to save
Sindell in exceptional circumstances is substantively unfair. Third,
the legislation does not begin to address the problems faced by
manufacturers in the mass-disaster cases.
1. The Overreach of the Sindell - Override Provisions
Section 4(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff establish in every product
liability case that the individual product unit which caused the harm
was manufactured by the defendant. This provision overrules deci-
sions such as Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,92 Anderson v.
Somberg" and other decisions which either substantively or pro-
cedurally affect the causation issue.
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.94 plaintiff was injured when
the brakes failed due to a defect in the master cylinder. The defen-
dant, Ford Motor Co., contended that it should not be held liable for
negligence in manufacturing the car without proof that the car was
defective when it relinquished control over it. Ford contended that
the car passed through two authorized Ford dealers before it was
delivered to plaintiff. Justice Traynor refused to recognize the Ford
defense. He reasoned:
It appears in the present case that Ford delegates the final
steps in that process (the manufacturing process) to its
authorized dealers that are ready to be driven away by
ultimate purchasers but relies on its dealers to make the
final inspections, corrections and adjustments necessary to
make the cars ready for use. Since Ford, as the manufac-
turer of the completed product, cannot delegate its duty to
have its cars delivered to the ultimate purchaser free from
dangerous defects, it cannot escape liability on the ground
that the defect in Vandermark's car may have been caused
by something one of the authorized dealers did or failed to
do.95
Thus, if one were to purchase a car with special equipment which
was installed by the dealer, Ford could not escape liability. It is,
e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W. 2d 20 (1979) (alternative liabil-
ity); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982)
(concerted action).
92. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
93. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975).
94. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896.
95. Id. at __, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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after all, a new Ford that was purchased. The buyer is entitled to
the good name of Ford standing behind the product he bought. The
nondelegable duty theory is hardly one that should shock the cons-
cience of responsible manufacturers. But under the language of Sec-
tion 4(a)(2), could the claimant establish that the "individual product
unit which allegedly caused the harm" was manufactured by the
defendant"?
Anderson v. Somberg98 would suffer a similar fate. In that case,
plaintiff was undergoing surgery to remove an intra-vertebra disc
when the tip of a rongeur (a surgical instrument) broke off and fell
into his spinal column where it could not be located. He brought ac-
tion for the resulting injury, joining the surgeon, the hospital, the
supplier and the manufacturer of the rongeur. The court held that
the jury should be instructed that one of the defendants must be
held liable and that it should decide which defendant was responsi-
ble. The decision in Anderson v. Somberg was a novel one. It
demanded that the jury find against the defendant in the chain of
distribution or use who was most likely at fault. The requirement of
Section 4(a)(2), that the claimant establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that "the individual product unit which caused the harm"
was manufactured by the defendant, might well bar the Anderson
result. 7
2. The Saving Provision
In order to mitigate the harshness of the clause which overrules
Sindell, the drafters have included Section 4(c), which allows for a
Sindell action in exceptional circumstances. It states:
If the claimant has introduced sufficient evidence to
allow a reasonable person, by a preponderance of the
evidence, to make all the determinations specified in subsec-
tion (a) with the exception of the determination specified in
subsection (a)(2), the product liability action nevertheless
may be submitted to the trier of fact for a determination of
the manufacturer's liability if the claimant proves by clear
and convincing evidence and if the court finds that-
(1) the claimant made every reasonable effort to
establish the identity of the manufacturer of the product
96. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1.
97. The Anderson result might also be barred by Sec. 4(a)(3) which requires
that the claimant establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
"unreasonably dangerous aspect of the product was a proximate cause of the harm."
Under Anderson, plaintiff is not required to establish that the defect was a cause of
the harm by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff need only establish that defen-
dant is the most likely at fault defendant. This is a considerably relaxed standard of
proof.
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unit which allegedly caused the harm complained of;
(2) the claimant has brought the product liability action
against every manufacturer which could have produced,
made, or constructed the product unit which allegedly caused
the harm complained of; and
(3) each of the manufacturers against whom the action is
brought is in a better position because of superior
knowledge or information than the claimant to establish
which manufacturer actually produced, made or constructed
the product unit which allegedly caused the harm complain-
ed of.9 8
If this section is meant to allow for a Sindell action, it will be a
rare case indeed when liability will attach. The section, as drafted, is
patently unfair. The provision which requires that "every manufac-
turer which could have produced, made or constructed the product
unit" be named as a defendant will, in most instances, be impossible
to meet. The Sindell action thus becomes a mirage. Furthermore,
since the Sindell action is premised on "market share" liability, why
does it become more fair when all of the defendants are named? No
defendant pays more than his percentage of the market share in any
event."
The requirement that the defendant manufacturer be in a "bet-
ter position because of superior knowledge or information than the
claimant to establish which manufacturer actually produced" the
product that caused the harm is also nonsensical. By inference, if
both parties are equally ignorant, the plaintiff is barred from utilizing
the Sindell theory. But the very problem in Sindell is that after
twenty years nobody is in a "better position" to identify the
98. Senate Bill § 4(c) (emphasis added).
99. The Sindell opinion required plaintiff to join in the action a "substantial
share" of the appropriate market. The court indicated that this may be fulfilled by
naming somewhat less than 75% of the market as defendants. The court gave two
justifications for this requirement: (1) the injustice of shifting the burden of proof on
causation (identification of the manufacturers of the individual product unit) is
diminished, as it is likely that one of the named manufacturers actually caused the in-
jury; and (2) apportionment of damages among the defendants will more accurately
reflect each defendant's actual market share. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 145. See Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell,
supra note 91, at 720-21, where the notewriter explains this second justification in light
of SindeUl's apparent apportionment of the entire damage award among the "substan-
tial share" of the market who are named defendants. The notewriter illustrates this
with a hypothetical wherein 80% of the market are named defendants, including X,
who owned a 20% market share. The named 80% are liable for 100% of the recovery;
X's 20% share of the market renders it liable for 25% of the recovery. If this is the in-
justice the drafters of the Senate Bill seek to eliminate, they could easily accomplish
this by limiting a 20% market share defendant to 20% of the damages in each case, in-
stead of requiring plaintiff to name 100% of the market.
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manufacturer who produced the pill which caused the plaintiff's in-
jury. It is hard to sustain a belief that this section was drafted in
good faith. If there was opposition to SindeUl, as there well might be,
the drafters should have had the courage of their convictions, rather
than draft a section which does not alleviate the problem.
Finally, the section as drafted makes no provision for a cause of
action based on conspiracy. Thus, to take the worst case, were a
group of ten manufacturers to sit down at a table and conspire to
manufacture a dangerous drug and to cover-up test results which in-
dicated problems with the drug, they could hide behind the lack of
identification issue when the product subsequently caused harm.
The only way to establish a cause of action even in the case of a
true conspiracy would be to establish each of the findings set forth
in Sections 4(c)(1)(2) and (3) by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, if
only nine of the conspirators could be named, there would be no
cause of action. Such an outrageous result cannot be countenanced
by anyone. The most charitable conclusion one can reach with
regard to this aspect of the problem is that the drafters simply did
not consider this issue.
3. The Mass-Disaster Cases
The DES and asbestos cases raise problems with regard to the
identification of the defendant who caused the harm to a particular
plaintiff."' But the causation problems are only symptomatic of the
larger problems that attend this kind of litigation. The real problem
that manufacturers face in these kinds of cases is that they face
potentially crushing liability for negligence that did not appear to be
so serious at the time the conduct was undertaken. It should be
noted that in the main, DES and the asbestos litigation have been
negligence based."' The defendants simply did not calculate that the
results would be as disasterous as they actually turned out to be.
100. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924; 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, (DES); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979)
(DES); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N Y.S.2d 776
(DES); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (DES); Starling
v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (1982) (asbestos); Aguilar v.
John-Mansville Corp. No. 400769 (San Diego Cty. Super. Ct. Cal. Sept. 8, 1981) (Califor-
nia trial court refused to apply Sindell in an asbestos case) (order without opinion).
101. See cases cited id. The landmark asbestos case, Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, was clearly based on a negligence theory. The court
said that in a failure to warn case, the danger must be reasonably foreseeable. In fact,
the court specifically held that "[tlhe requirement of forseeability coincides with the
standard of due care in negligence cases in that a seller must exercise reasonable care
and foresight to discover a danger in his product and to warn users and consumers of
that danger." 493 F.2d at 1088. The court specifically rejected a strict liability theory.
Id. at n.22. For more recent popular literature on this subject see N.Y. Times, Sept. 7,
1982 at 26, Col. 1.
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Thus, minor negligence led to major catastrophe. The real problem
faced by these defendants is not they are being forced to pay a pro-
portional share of the damages. The problem is that the brute dollar
amounts are staggering. They far exceed that which could be
calculated to be the risk normally attendant to even negligent
behavior.
In industries where the imposition of liability will mean the
bankruptcy of important companies, there may well be a need to leg-
islate to provide for the individual situation. Given the facts of
particular situations, legislation might provide for a more limited
form of recovery to those injured and yet stop far short of actually
forcing the industries to close their doors. Certainly there has been
enough experience with alternative compensation schemes to con-
sider creative legislative solutions to these kinds of situations.'
3 I
believe that the future will call for legislation addressed to the par-
ticular industry and to the special kinds of harms caused by the pro-
duct. The solutions will have to be tailor-made to fit the problems.
They cannot be dealt with by addressing the peripheral issue of de-
fendant identification. If there is doubt as to the validity of this
argument, consider whether the situation would be much different if
there were only one drug company involved in the manufacture of
DES, or one manufacturer who produced asbestos products. Assume
further that the projected damages threatened to wipe out two ma-
jor corporate giants that employ tens of thousands of workers.
Assume also that clear cases of negligence were established against
these defendants. Would the social and political problems be any dif-
ferent than those faced today by the several drug companies and as-
bestos manufacturers? In this senario the issues of strict liability
and defendant identification would be absent. The problems wrought
by massive litigation would be very much with us.
B. Did the Defect Cause the Harm
Section 4(a)(3) of S. 2631 addresses the question of the causal rela-
tionship between the defect and harm. For liability to attach, it is
necessary that "the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the product was
102. Following the Chapter XI filing of UNR Industries and Johns-Manville
Corp., the Asbestos Compensation Coalition, a group of nine companies named as
defendants in asbestos cases, appealed to Congress to enact through legislation a com-
pensation scheme jointly financed by industry and government, and administered
through existing workmen's compensation systems. 10 PSLR 514, 573-74 (1982).
103. Worker's compensation statutes and automobile no-fault statutes are ex-
amples of systems developed to deal with very specific social problems in which
something less than traditional tort recovery is allowed. See generally, W. PROSSER, J.
WADE & D. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1294-1329 (7th ed. 1982).
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a proximate cause of the harm complained of by the claimant."1 °4
This requirement paraphrases good hornbook law."5 Plaintiff bears
the burden of proving causation. If the courts will fall back on
longstanding precedent to give meaning to the statutory language,
little will have been gained or lost by the enactment of this section.
However, one cannot be assured that a new statutory scheme will
not reopen the causation question anew. By mandating that the
"unreasonably dangerous aspect" of the product be the proximate
cause of the harm, the statute places emphasis on the "but-for" test.
It is only by structuring a hypothetical situation in which the defect
is removed from the scene, that one can determine whether that
aspect of the product was the cause of the harm. Yet, it is a rather
badly kept secret that the but-for test has been honored more in the
breach than in its observance.' In the real world, causation is so
closely tied to liability that they cannot be torn asunder."7 To man-
date that the but-for test be actually established by a plaintiff is
sheer folly. Thus, courts will either ignore the statute, as they have
ignored the common law rule that cause-in-fact be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, or plaintiffs will be barred from
recovering in cases where it is entirely legitimate for them to win.
Once again, there is no evidence that proof of causation is a
special problem area in product litigation. The statute thus ad-
dresses a non-problem by enacting a common law approach into
what may become an ironclad rule. If the legislation were structured
to address only problem areas, there need be no section with this
aspect of causation.
C. Causation in Failure to Warn Cases
In an earlier section, the provisions of section 6, which dealt with
standards for adequate warnings, were addressed. 8 Section 6 also
contains a special causation provision which must be established by
the plaintiff. Section 6(b)(4) requires that the claimant prove that
104. Senate Bill § 4(a)(3) (emphasis added). The analogue in the House Bill is Sec.
5(a)(1)(B).
105. PROSSER, supra note 43, § 103 at 672.
106. Malone, supra note 45; Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts:
An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. OF CH. L. REV. 69 (1975); Haft v. Lone-Palm
Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 30, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970); Stevens v. Parke-Davis & Co.,
9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263,
282 A.2d 206 (1971).
107. Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 586 (1933); Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer's Implications
on Rules of Liability and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REv. 769,
778-84 (1977); Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine
Cause-in-Fact, 46 TEx. L. REV. 423 (1968).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
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"the warnings or instructions which the claimant alleges would have
led a reasonably prudent product user either to decline to use the
product or to use it in a manner so as to avoid harm of the type
alleged by the claimant."1 °9
The use of the hypothetical but-for as a test for causation forces
one to ask the question "whether a reasonably prudent person
would have read the warning which was never given." If the warn-
ing would not have helped, then it need not have been given. Under
Section 6(b)(2), only warnings that are mandated by risk-utility
analysis need be provided. For a risk-reduction warning, Section 4 is
surplusage."'
There is, however, another type of warning which merits careful
attention. With regard to many products, a warning cannot function
to reduce the risk level attendant to the use of a product."' This is
especially true with regard to drugs and industrial chemicals. The
function of a warning in these cases is to inform the consumer of a
non-reducible risk and give him the option not to use the product.
This closely parallels the doctrine of "material risk" in the law of
medical malpractice."' To adopt a theory which imposes a duty to
warn of such risks and then to say that recovery will be permitted
if, but only if, a reasonable person would have declined to use the
product, is to engage in circular reasoning. The purpose of the warn-
ing is to provide the opportunity to the consumer to make'a choice.
If the warning has not been given, he has been deprived of his right
to choose intelligently. To then say that recovery will be denied if a
reasonable person would have chosen to use the product, makes a
mockery of the warning duty. The function of the warning is to
give the plaintiff the right to be unreasonable if he so desires. Thus,
a plaintiff fully informed of the risk of polio vaccination may decide
to make a foolish choice and not take the vaccine. That is the con-
sumer's right. As long as his right to informed choice has been ef-
fected, it should be no defense that a reasonable person, given the
109. Senate Bill § 6(b)(4). House Bill § 5(d)(5) requires that the "claimant . . .
would have avoided the harm if such warnings . . . had been provided."
110. If it is intended to truly focus on the hypothetical question with a focus on
the claimant and not the reasonable person as suggested by House Bill § 5(d)(5), then
we create the problem which caused several courts to create a rebuttable presumption
that a warning, if given, would have been followed. See, e.g., Technical Chemical Co. v.
Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602; Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat. Bank, __
Ind. App. -, 332 N.E.2d 820 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d
974 (1976); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1074).
111. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 74, at 517-21;
Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the UPLL, supra note 12, at 235.
112. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245-46, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Reptr.
505, 515-16 (1972); Goldstein, For Harold Laswelk Some Reflections on Human Dignity,
Entrapment, Informed Consent and the Plea Bargain, 84 Yale L.J. 683, 691 (1975).
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risk information, would have chosen to encounter the risk. If the
plaintiff never was given the information, he was deprived of his
right to choose. A far better test is that articulated by the
Washington Court of Appeals in Miller v. Kennedy," ' in which the
court, in the context of a medical malpractice case, defined the duty
of a doctor to disclose risks in the following manner:
The scope of the duty to disclose information concerning
the treatment proposed, other treatments and the risk of
each course of action and of no treatment at all is measured
by the patient's need to know. The inquiry as to each item of
information which the doctor knows or should know about
the patient's physical condition is "Would the patient as a
human being consider this item in choosing his or her course
of treatment?"
1 1 4
This test can easily be paraphrased to meet the product liability
situation. Once it has been established that a warning is mandated,
the question should be whether a reasonable consumer would want
the information before deciding to utilize the product. It should be
noted that this test applies only to those warnings whose function is
merely to inform the consumer about non-reducible risks. In those
instances where the function of a warning is to affect consumer
behavior in his utilization of the product, we must revert to a cause-
in-fact analysis. However, cause-in-fact should not be frozen into
hard legislative language. It is too complex an issue. It requires the
flexibility of common law case-by-case analysis to determine
whether, given the underlying substantive goals which the law
seeks to protect, the causation issue should be stretched or
retracted.
V. WARNINGS TO WHOM - SHIFTING DUTY
The Kasten bill directs its attention to the question as to who
should bear responsibility for relaying warning information. As
drafted, it adds little protection for defendant-manufacturers. In
fact, a good argument can be made that it actually derogates from
defenses available to defendant-manufacturers at common law. Sec-
tion 6(d)(1) of S. 2631 provides:
A product is not unreasonably dangerous for lack of
necessary or postmanufacture warnings or instructions if
those warnings or instructions were provided to-
113. 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974) aff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334
(1975).
114. Id. at 282, 522 P.2d at 860. Later in the opinion the court said that it would
require proof that "a reasonable, prudent patient probably would not have consented
to the treatment when informed of the material risk .. " Id. at 290, 522 P.2d at 864.
The two tests are irreconcilable. The latter test is very much like Senate Bill § 6(b)(4).
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(A) a person, including an employer, who could reason-
ably have been expected to assure that action would be
taken to avoid the harm or that the risk of harm would be
explained to the actual product user;
(B) the using or supervising expert, where the product
involved is one which may be legally used only by or under
the supervision of a class of experts. For purposes of this
clause, warnings or instructions are considered provided to
the using or supervising expert where the manufacturer em-
ployed means reasonably calculated to make them available
to the expert, and this does not require actual, personal
notice to the expert."5
If Section 6(d)(1)(A) was intended to overrule cases where the de-
fendant has given warning to an employer who has failed to pass the
warning on to employees, then it has failed in its intended purpose.
The key statutory words are "been expected to assure." The problem
that courts have faced in the employment cases is that employers
who sit under the protection of worker's compensation often have
little incentive to "assure" that safety features be installed, or that
employees be warned against specific risks."' Where worker produc-
tivity comes in conflict with safety, the employer is often prone to
opt for productivity as the more desirable choice. Thus, courts that
found against manufacturers in the past will not be intimidated by
the language in Section 6(d)(1)." '1
There is an argument that by negative inference the statute has
cut back on the shifting duty defense. It should be noted that the
shifting duty argument, which cuts off liability if a third person (in-
cluding an employer) "would have been reasonably expected to
assure that action would be taken to avoid the harm," is set forth
only to negate a failure to warn claim.1 8 No similar provision is
found in the design defect section." 9 There is good reason not to
make the shifting duty an automatic defense to a design defect case.
If the defendant should have designed the safety into the product at
the time of manufacture, then it should not be absolved of respon-
sibility merely because a third person also failed to take protective
action. However, there are cases in which it is entirely appropriate to
115. Senate Bill § 6(d)(1) (emphasis added).
116. See UPLA, supra note 1, § 174 Analysis at 67,240-41.
117. House Bill § 5(d)(4)(A)(iii) would accomplish the desired goal more effec-
tively.
118. Senate Bill § 6(d)(1).
119. Id. at § 5(b). The general requirement embodied in Sec. 4(a)(3), that the
defect be the proximate cause of the harm, might cut off liability in the case of an in-
tervening superseding cause. But, that does not alter the reality that the specific shift-
ing duty provision is specifically provided for only in the warning section.
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raise the shifting duty argument even when design defect has been
clearly established. In Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner,1" the defendant
was relieved from liability for having defectively designed the hood
latch on its automobiles. Ford offered to replace the latches free of
charge to owners of the automobile. The owner declined to have the
car repaired. When the hood flew up and injured a subsequent
owner, Ford was relieved from liability. This is an eminently sensi-
ble result. At some point the duty for an existing danger may shift
to another responsible party. It would appear that by including a
shifting duty defense in the failure to warn section, and excluding it
from the design section, the inference to be drawn is that it is not
an appropriate defense to a design action. That would be an unfor-
tunate interpretation of the statute.
Section 6(d)(1)(B), which establishes a shifting duty defense when
warnings or instruction are provided to a supervising expert, 2' is
yet another example of the proliferation of new and heretofore
undefined terms. When is an expert an expert? The caveat that the
product involved be one, which may be legally used only by or under
the supervision of a class of experts, is not helpful. Where are we to
turn to explain the term "legally uses"? Is it the penal law, the state
safety codes, OSHA, administrative regulations, or the common law
of torts?
The attempt to reduce the concept of shifting duty or the
transfer of responsibility to simple statutory language is bound to
fail. The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, when faced
with the problem of articulating a rule for shifting duty, recognized
that no simple formulation was available. In Section 452, comment f,
they said:
The circumstances may be such that the court will find that
all duty and responsibility for the prevention of the harm
has passed to the third person. It is apparently impossible to
state any comprehensive rule as to when such a decision will
be made. Various factors will enter into it. Among them are
the degree of danger and the magnitude of the risk of harm,
the character and position of the third person who is to take
the responsibility, his knowledge of the danger and the
likelihood that he will or will not exercise proper care, his
relation to the plaintiff or to the defendant, the lapse of
time, and perhaps other considerations. The most that can
be stated here is that when, by reason of the interplay of
such factors, the court finds that full responsibility for con-
120. 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1946). See also Rekab, Inc., v. Frank
Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971).
121. Senate Bill § 6(d)(1)(B).
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trol of the situation and prevention of the threatened harm
has passed to the third person his failure to act is then a
superseding cause, which will relieve the original actor of
liability.'2
Again, the drafter of S. 2631 would have been well advised to leave
this area to the common law. The sections as drafted lend
themselves to interpretive abuse.
VI. THE DUAL JOINT - TORTFEASOR STANDARD
S. 2631 has some very strange provisions affecting joint-tort-
feasor liability. Section 9 establishes a general rule of comparative
responsibility to be applied not only between the claimant and de-
fendant-manufacturer, but to affect third party defendants as well."
It then mandates that judgment be entered against each party
"determined to be liable in proportion to the degree of responsibil-
ity."'24 Section 9(d) provides, however, that the joint-tortfeasor
theory is not entirely eliminated. If, within one year after the judg-
ment is entered it is determined that part of the obligation is un-
collectable, the amount that is uncollectable is reallocated to the
other parties and the claimant according to the respective percen-
tages of their responsibility.' 25 Although this section cuts back
somewhat on joint-tortfeasor liability by delaying the recovery in
the case of uncollectable judgments for one year by reallocating the
amount that was uncollectable to all parties including the plaintiff
(whose recovery was already reduced by the percentage of his fault),
it basically retains the structure of joint-tortfeasor liability.
Sections 10(a) and (b) are much more radical." In the case of pro-
duct misuse or product alteration (or modification), the claimant's
recovery is reduced to the extent that the misuse or alteration was
a "cause of the harm." Unlike Section 9, no provisions are made for
the case of uncollectible judgments or legally immunized defendants.
The reduction is absolute.
To test the workings of the statute it will be helpful to construct
two simple hypothetical cases and observe how the statute would re-
solve them. One must remember that the statute operates to reduce
the claimant's recovery in cases when the misuse or alteration is
forseeable by the defendant-manufacturer. In cases where such con-
duct is unforseeable, the statute appears to provide for a total ex-
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452 comment (Q) emphasis added).
123. Senate Bill §§ 9(a), (b).
124. Id. at 9(c).
125. Id. at § 9(d).
126. Id. at §§ 10(a), (b).
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emption for the manufacturer. Sections 10(a) and (b) provide that the
"trier of fact may determine that the harm caused by the product
occurred solely because of misuse of the product."'"
Now for the hypotheticals:
A) Sam Jones is a pedestrian crossing the street while observ-
ing all traffic regulations. Jack Smith, while speeding 15
mph over the limit, makes a left-hand turn and strikes Sam
Jones. Smith is driving a 1980 Ford Galaxy. In 1980 Ford
had a problem with motor mounts on its Galaxy model. The
problem later warranted a recall by Ford. Evidence estab-
lishes that the Smith-Jones accident was caused by the com-
bination of speeding and loss of control of the car by the
driver due to the motor mounts that failed because they
were not properly fastened.
B) Sam Jones is a pedestrian crossing the street while
observing all traffic regulations. Jack Smith strikes Jones
when making a left-hand turn into the crosswalk. Smith is
driving a 1980 Ford at the time of the accident. In 1980 Ford
had a problem with motor mounts on its Galaxy model. This
problem later warranted a recall by Ford. Smith had felt
some rumbling while driving and had sought as a do-it-
yourselfer to tighten the bolts. However, while attempting
repair, he negligently switched the ratchet to loosen rather
than tighten the bolts. The accident occurred because driver
Smith lost control of his car when the motor mounts gave
way.
I believe that the application of Sections 10(a) and (b) to these
hypothetical cases would result in the plaintiff retaining Ford as a
joint-tortfeasor in Case A, but not in Case B. Thus, in Case A, if a
jury were to find Smith 60% at fault for speeding and Ford 40% at
fault for the defective motor mounts, Ford would retain traditional
joint-tortfeasor liability. If Smith were to- carry minimal $10,000-
20,000 automobile insurance coverage, Jones would be able to turn
to Ford after 1 year to recover for the remainder of his injuries not
caused by Smith. It is not likely that speeding 15 mph over the limit
would be construed as product misuse as defined in Section 10(a)(2).
Case B, however, would be very different. Smith's attempted
tightening of defectively attached motor mounts could amount to
either product misuse under Section 10(a)(2) or product alteration
127. Id. It is assumed that this refers to the general tort rule that cuts off liabil-
ity when the injury was unforseeable. See discussion in Twerski, The Many Faces of
Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER
L. REV. 403, 431-32 (1978).
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under Section 10(b)(2). Assuming the same 60%-40% fault apportion-
ment, this would mean that Ford is liable only for its 40% even
though Smith's alteration was brought about in part by Ford's
negligence and was forseeable. Given the likelihood that Smith's
conduct (negligent alteration) is generally not an insured-for event,
the practical ramification of Sections 10(a) and (b) is that the claim-
ant bears 60% of the loss. Putting aside the questionable justice of
depriving the plaintiff of a faulty joint-tortfeasor as a fully liable
defendant, the differing treatment provided by Sections 9 and 10 to
those who cause accidents while using products is puzzling. What
limit of logic supports the continuance of the joint-tortfeasor doc-
trine when the product user's misconduct (i.e., speeding) is not pro-
duct related, but negates the joint-tortfeasor doctrine when the con-
duct is product related? If anything, common sense would dictate
the very opposite result. Here again, we find more than sloppy
draftsmanship at work. By attempting to regulate every aspect of
the product liability action, and by seeking to work out its interac-
tions with other aspects of tort law, the drafters simply trip over
themselves.
The problem raised by the hypothetical cases is even more
serious than set forth above. By establishing a two-track system,
i.e., one that maintains and one that abolishes joint-tortfeasor liabil-
ity, the drafters have made it a matter of considerable consequence
as to whether a defendant's conduct qualifies as misuse or alteration
under Sections 10(a)2 and 10(b)(2), or whether it comes under the
more general Section 9 comparative responsibility rule. A brief
glance at the language of Sections 10(a)(2) and 10(b)(2) should con-
vince anyone that years of appellate litigation lie ahead before it is
determined which conduct qualifies for which section. Returning to
Case A, driving 15 mph over the speed limit should not qualify as
product misuse within the meaning of section 10(a)(2). But what
about driving 25 mph over the speed limit? Does that conduct consti-
tute use of a product in a manner "which is not consistent with
reasonable practice of users of the product"? i2 8
Finally, both Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(b)(1) demand that in the
case of misuse or alteration the claimant's recovery be reduced to
the extent that the misuse or alteration was a "cause of the harm."
One can reduce recovery by fault apportionment, but it approaches
sophistry to say that damages are to be apportioned by "com-
parative cause."
Assume an accident takes place because an employer negligently
altered the switch on a plastic molding machine that should have
had a safety guard to prevent accidental exposure by employees to
the point of operation of the machine. Who caused the accident? Any
128. Senate Bill § 10(a)(2).
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first-year law student worth his or her salt would answer, "both the
employer and the defendant-manufacturer." Each was the cause in
fact of the harm. But come now, who really caused it? Again the
answer is both. Had the employer not altered the switch, the acci-
dent would have been avoided. Had the defendant-manufacturer
properly designed the machine, the safety guard would have
prevented the plaintiff's hands from becoming caught in the
machine. The causation label adds nothing to the analysis.
There is an explanation which may give meaning to "compara-
tive cause," but it is so fatally flawed that it dare not be indulged in
with any seriousness. Consider the following hypothetical:
An intoxicated motocyclist traveling 65 mph crosses the
center line of the highway and runs into a truck going 65
mph. Considering the weight, speed, and direction of each
vehicle, it is scientifically determined that the truck con-
tributed 95 percent of the force involved. If damages are ap-
portioned on this basis, the motocyclist's estate would
receive 95 percent of the damages."
Returning to our hypothetical case of the plastic molding machine,
how much of the injury was "caused" by the design defect and how
much was caused by the altered switch? Surely, the answer is not to
be determined by comparing the weight of the switch and the
weight of the press.
If one were to include in the fault apportionment many of the
factors which are normally considered in the proximate cause for-
mulation, some sense could be made out of a "cause"
apportionment."M There is, however, no reason to believe that the
statute as written embodies a sophisticated proximate cause analy-
sis. '3 Certainly, a few poorly reasoned decisions which have spoken
in terms of comparative cause are not sufficient grounds to serve as
a predicate for a nationally binding statute for a yet undefined doc-
trine.
A. Comparative Responsibility
As noted earlier, Section 9 adopts an across the board defense of
129. For a similar analysis, see SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 276 (1974).
130. See, e.g., Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 2(b) (1977); UPLA, supra note 1,
§ 1110)(3) and Analysis at 62,736.
131. The omission of the language contained in both the UPLA and the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act would lead to the conclusion that the authors did not intend
the proximate cause analysis.
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comparative fault for product liability actions. There has been more
than enough discussion about the wisdom of applying the compara-
tive fault principles to strict products liability. 82 The argument that
it calls for comparing "apples" and "oranges" is not persuasive. The
thrust of the comparative fault doctrine has been to place some of
the responsibility on the plaintiff for his own contribution to his in-
juries.' It calls for a rough sense of justice. This can be accom-
plished by focusing on plaintiffs conduct and reducing recovery by a
percentage deemed by the jury to be adequate to reflect his contri-
132. General Motors v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Murry v. Fairbanks
Morse. 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction &
Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977); Sun Valley Airlines Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976).
133. See, Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. Al
L. & CoM. 107 (1976); Carestia, The Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict
Products Liability- Where are We?, 47 INS. COUNSEL J. 53 (1980); Epstein, Plaintiffs
Conduct in Products Liability Actions: Comparative Negligence, Automatic Division
and Multiple Parties, 45 J. AIR. L. & COM. 87 (1979); Feinberg, The Applicability of a
Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict Products Liability Suit Based on Section
402A of the Restatement of Torts, 2d (Can Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INs. COUNSEL J. 39
(1975); Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo.
L. REV. 431 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fischer, Products Liability]; Fischer, Products
Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence to Misuse and Assumption of the
Risk, 43 Mo. L. REV. 643 (1978); Fisher, Nugent & Lewis, Comparative Negligence: An
Exercise in Applied Justice, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 655 (1974); Fleming, The Supreme Court
of California, 1974-1975-Forward Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial
Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239 (1976); Freedman, The Comparative Negligence Doctrine
Under Strict Liability: Defendant's Conduct Becomes Another "Proximate Cause" of
Injury, Damage or Loss, 1975 INs. L. J. 468; Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the
Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1968); Maleson,
Negligence is Dead but its Doctrines Rule Us from the Grave: A Proposal to Limit
Defendant's Responsibility in Strict Products Liability Actions Without Resorting to
Proximate Cause, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1978); McNichols, The Kirkland v. General Motors
Manufacturers' Products Liability Doctrine- What's in a Name?, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 347
(1974); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972); Phillips, The Standard for Determin-
ing Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 CIN. L. REV. 101 (1977); Schwartz, Con-
tributory Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978); Schwartz, Strict Liabil-
ity and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974); Vetri, Products Liabil-
ity: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REv. 293 (1975); Wade,
Crawford & Ryder, Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past, Present and
Future, 41 TENN. L. REV. 423 (1974); Walkowiak, Reconsidering Plaintiffs Fault in Pro-
ducts Liability Litigation: The. Proposed Conscious Design Choice Exceptions, 33
VAND. L. REV. 651 (1980); Westra, Restructuring the Defenses to Strict Products
Liability-An Alternative to Comparative Negligence, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 355
(1979); Note, Comparative Negligence Collides with Strict Liability: Will Tort Law
Ever be the Same?, 19 WASHBURN L. J. 76 (1979); Note, Daly v. General Motors Corp.:
Principles of Comparative Fault Applied to Strict Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 936 (1979); ,Case Comment, Products Liability-Misconduct by the Plaintiff Will
Reduce or Eliminate Damages Recoverable from a Seller or Manufacturer Under
Strict Liability-Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978), 13 SUF-
FOLK U.L. REV. 1558 (1979).
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bution to the injury.'s Another approach to the problem is to assess
the percentage of fault attributable to the defendant by equating
the seriousness of product defect with fault. A more serious defect
would call for a higher percentage of fault. A less serious defect.
would demand a lesser fault apportionment.'35
In an article written shortly before his death, Professor Wayne
Thode, one of the great tort professors of our time, sharply criti-
cized this formulation and suggested an alternate approach."3 He
argued that the fault comparison was inappropriate because plain-
tiff's conduct could not be measured against product defectiveness.'37
He finds the "comparative causation" doctrine discussed earlier, to
be a nonsensical doctrine. He correctly observes that "[O]ne reason
why comparing cause is not rational is that there is no norm for
causation. All the trier of fact can do is try to find out what in fact
happened. Cause cannot be qualified so how can it be compared?"'"
Instead Thode suggests that we adopt a doctrine of "comparative
risks." He contends that:
The risk that the defendant's conduct in putting out a defec-
tive product has created to the plaintiff and to others of a
similar group in the zone of danger can be compared with
the risks created by the plaintiff's faulty conduct to himself
and to others within the zone of danger created by his con-
duct. The likelihood of injury, the seriousness of the poten-
tial injury and the number of persons placed in danger by
the party's conduct are all elements to be considered in mak-
ing the risk allocation.'
Although there are slight differences in theory between the Thode
approach and my proposal that defect be equated with fault, those
differences do not appear to be of great moment.' Enough has been
said to demonstrate that the theoretical difficulties in adopting a
comparative fault principle for product liability actions are not of
great moment. In fact, the reversion to a negligence theory for
design and failure to warn cases moots the theoretical problems
134. Twerski, supra note 39, at 326-29.
135. Id. See also Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149.
136. Thode, Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons in Product Liability
Cases, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 3 (1981).
137. Id. at 4-6.
138. Id. at 8.
139. Id. at 9.
140. My suggestion that defect be equated with fault is admittedly flawed. Very
minor negligence could create a very serious defect and vice versa. Nonetheless, if
fault is not considered personal, but rather product-oriented, my suggestion and that
of the late Professor Thode are close enough to be "kissing cousins."
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since these cases are no longer based on strict liability, but are
fault-based.'
What is disconcerting about an inexorable directive to courts to
apply comparative fault to all product liability actions, is that it will
reduce recovery in cases where fair-minded persons would agree
that recovery should not be reduced. By removing discretion from
courts to deal with these cases, the proposed bill demands unjust
results. It has elsewhere been suggested that in the following
hypothetical cases comparative fault should not be applied.14 This
argument is made whether the underlying theory for recovery is
strict liability or negligence:
(A) Plaintiff was driving on the highway in his 1976 XYZ
model car. He was speeding at twenty miles per hour over
the limit. He lost control of the auto and collided with the
median strip retainer. Due to a defectively designed door
latch plaintiff was thrown from the car and suffered serious
injuries. His injuries would have been minor had the door
latch held.
(B) Plaintiff was injured when a poorly beaded tire on his car
blew out. At the time of the accident plaintiff was speeding
twenty miles per hour over the limit. The evidence is such
that had plaintiff been driving at the appropriate speed limit
he would have been able to bring his car under control and
could have avoided impact with another car.
(C) Plaintiff was an experienced factory worker who at the
time of the accident was helping operate a machine designed
to break glass and stack glass strips. He was working on the
west side of the machine while his supervisor operated the
controls on the east side of the machine. As he continued to
operate the machine, plaintiff noticed that glass appeared to
be jamming the machine, and he became concerned that the
machine was being damaged. To thwart this possibility plain-
tiff attempted to remove a piece of glass with his hand, but
his glove caught in the machinery, and he was injured.
There was evidence presented in the case that the glass cut-
ting machine was defective in that it did not contain ade-
quate safety features such as off-on switches on both sides of
the machine, or a barrier or guard to keep individuals from
putting their extremities into the machine.
It is evident that in certain cases the contributory negligence
defense is inappropriate, whether it be clothed as a complete bar or
as comparative negligence. Hypothetical (A) places the question in
141. Senate Bill §§ 5(b), 6(b).
142. Twerski, supra note 134, at 341.
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very sharp focus. In that case a speeding plaintiff was thrown from
a car, which was designed with a defective door latch, when the car
collided with a median strip retainer. Should the fact that plaintiff
was contributorily negligent in bringing about the collision through
his speeding reduce his recovery?"' In a second collision case where
plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries which were aggravated by the
defendant's failure to properly design the vehicle, it should be un-
thinkable to reduce plaintiffs recovery by the percentage of his
fault for the original collision. If the judgment is made that the
design of the vehicle was in fact unreasonable, it is because the
defendant has a duty to design against the possible effects of colli-
sions. This takes in the possibility of collisions which are brought
about through the plaintiff's fault and those in which he has been
faultless. It is simply not reasonable to conclude that defendant's
design modifications to make the auto crashworthy are for the
benefit of only faultless plaintiffs. We know otherwise. To either ex-
cuplate the defendant, or to permit the reduction of total damages
based on the fact that plaintiff had also been at fault, is to demean
the very process in which we determined that defendant's design
was substandard.
Hypothetical (B) should be analyzed in a similar vein. Admittedly,
in this case plaintiffs speeding has contributed to the harm. Had
plaintiff been traveling at the appropriate speed limit, he would
have been able to bring his car under control. The car did, however,
go out of control due to a defect in the tire. If, for example, plaintiff
was traveling 65 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone, should
his recovery be reduced in an action brought against the tire
manufacturer? The defendant had a clear duty to make a tire that
was beaded properly and that could operate under normal driving
conditions. While plaintiff's conduct is negligent vis-a-vis the world
at large, it is not negligent to the defendant tire manufacturer. This
is a case where the application of the comparative fault principle
would reduce plaintiffs recovery even though he had a legitimate
right to demand that the product meet expected performance levels.
Hypothetical (C), where plaintiff has his hand cut off by the
143. For a negative answer to the hypothetical see Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86
Wis. 2d 628, 275 N.W.2d 233 (1979). It is interesting that the drafters of the UPLA
agreed that comparative fault should not reduce recovery in this kind of case. UPLA,
supra note 1, § 111 Analysis at 62,735. The reasoning of the drafters of the UPLA is
decidedly wrong although they come up with the right result. They argue that the
negligent driving is not the proximate cause of the enhanced injuries. This is sheer
nonsense. It is highly forseeable to a neglgent driver that a car may not be well-built
or sufficiently designed for second-collision protection. The reason for negating com-
parative fault in these cases has little to do with causation. It has much to do with the
common sense observation that safety features should be there to protect negligent
and non-negligent drivers alike.
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unguarded cutting edge of a glass cutting machine, presents a more
difficult question as to the appropriateness of comparative fault.
Here it is clear that plaintiff is, in a sense, pitting his wits against
the machine. He hopes to release the jamming of the machine and to
prevent further damage to the machinery. The real question is
whether a guard at the point of operation should have been in-
troduced to reduce the chance that a dedicated employee, afraid
that an expensive piece of equipment will be damaged, will risk in-
jury to himself? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative,
it is difficult to justify reducing plaintiffs verdict, when he is in-
jured by absence of the very mechanism which should have pro-
tected him in the first place.
There is good reason to settle the theoretical issue in favor of
the applicability of comparative fault to product liability litigation.'
There is no reason to strip the courts of discretion by mandating its
application to all fact patterns. The statute should mandate com-
parative fault as a general principle, but allow courts to refuse to
apply it when to do so would be contrary to their sense of "fairness
and justice" under the particular facts of the case. The most recent
attempt to particularize the categories of plaintiff's conduct to be in-
cluded or excluded from comparative fault does not give encourage-
ment that the task can be accomplished. The drafters of the UPLA,
after exhaustive efforts, came up with a plethora of categories and
some very unappetizing results.4 ' Both extremes should be avoided.
A national products liability act should not mandate comparative
negligence in all product liability actions, nor should it attempt ex-
cessive particularization by defining categories of plaintiffs conduct.
It should set forth an operating principle and leave to the good
sense of the courts the discretion to exempt those cases in which
the comparative fault principle should not apply. Such a statute
would in practice accomplish comparative fault for the vast majority
of product cases and yet would retain discretion for exceptional
cases. This approach is far less intrusive on traditional state
prerogatives in controlling tort litigation because it allows courts to
exercise some discretion when dealing with rather special fact pat-
terns.
VII. WORKER'S COMPENSATION
The interaction between worker's compensation and the present
liability system must be derived from several sections of S. 2631.
Section 11(a) speaks to the issue:
144. See supra text accompanying notes 134-41.
145. UPLA, supra note 1, § 112 and Analysis at 62, ,736-37. See Twerski &
Weinstein, A Critique of the UPLL, supra note 12, at 249.
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(a) In any product liability action in which damages are
sought for harm for which the person injured is entitled to
compensation under any State or Federal workers compensa-
tion law, the damages shall be reduced by the sum of (1) the
amount paid as worker compensation benefits for that harm;
and (2) the present value of all worker compensation benefits
to which the employee is or would be entitled for the harm.
If a person eligible to file a claim for worker compensation
benefits has not filed such a claim, the trier of fact shall
determine at the time of trial the amount of worker compen-
sation benefits to which the claimant would be entitled in
the future or the amount to which the claimant would have
been entitled if the claimant had filed a worker compensa-
tion claim.
(b) Unless the manufacturer or product seller has ex-
pressly agreed to indemnify or hold an employer harmless
for harm to an employee caused by a product-
(1) the employer shall have no right of subrogation,
contribution, implied indemnity or lien against the manufac-
turer or product seller if the harm is one for which a product
liability action may be brought under this Act; and
(2) the worker compensation insurance carrier of the
employer shall have no right of subrogation against the
manufacturer or product seller.14
By eliminating the employer subrogation lien, the Senate Bill strikes
at one of the aspects of the present system which manufacturers
claim to be most unfair."7 According to a 1977 Insurance Services
Office study, employer negligence is implicated in 56.3/o of all
employment related product liability claims. 48  Manufacturers
146. Senate Bill § 11. See also House Bill § 10. This approach has been enacted
in CONN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(r) (Supp. 1982). It has been advocated by Professor
Richard Epstein in Coordination of Workers' Compensation Benefits with Tort
Damages, 13 FORUM 464-79 (1978) and the American Insurance Association, Product
Liability Legislation Package at 65-66 (1977). It is also included in UPLA, supra note 1,
§ 114 at 62,740. The UPLA approach changed from that recommended in the draft
UPLL which permitted contribution "where the employer's failure to comply with any
statutory or common law duty" contributed to the claimants injury. Such contribution
was not to exceed the amount of the worker compensation. UPLL, supra note 28, § 113
at 3001. The UPLL approach has support in case law. See Santistoven v. Dow
Chemical Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1974); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312
Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1974).
147. 8 Final Report of the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability
89-99 (1977); American Insurance Association, supra note 146, at 64-74.
148. Insurance Services Office, Product Liability Closed Claim Survey: A
Technical Analysis of Survey Results Report 10 at 64-66. The conclusion that
negligence was involved in this percentage of claims is based on responses to the
following question: "Would the insured have impleaded the employer but for the Sole
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rightfully argue that the subrogation lien often permits the most
guilty party to walk away from the injury scot free. By providing
that the worker's compensation recovery reduces any compensation
award by a like amount and that no subrogation lien exists on behalf
of the employer, the Senate Bill permits the plaintiff to retain the
very same benefits he now enjoys, and at the same time shifts part
of the cost from the manufacturer to the employer where it right-
fully belongs. Admittedly, the employers will not recover from the
manufacturer in a subrogation action where the employer was not
negligent. This shifts some of the costs to the worker's compensa-
tion system which may not rightfully belong there. " 9
When one considers the possible alternatives available to
resolve the problem, the Section 11 solution, if it were only unen-
cumbered by the Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(b)(1) qualifications, would
strike a good balance. The present situation is intolerable. The no-
fault worker's compensation system bears no responsibility what-
soever for employers' faulty conduct. By permitting the subrogation
lien in favor of the employer, it does more than protect the worker's
compensation system from tort recovery. It protects worker's com-
pensation from itself. It does so by invading the tort recovery
system without having to pay allegiance to the principles of the
system from which it seeks recovery. The tort system would not
allow the third party action without inquiry into the fault of the par-
ties inter se."0 The blanket employer subrogation lien is not founded
on the principle of worker's compensation (pay out with no fault),
nor that of the tort (fault) system. Perhaps it is based on the "Robin
Hood" principle, but even that assumption would require some ob-
jective data to support it.
It might be argued that the proposed statute would accomplish
"mirror image" injustice."' The fault-based defendant would be shift-
ing partial liability for an injury, which is entirely the fault of the
manufacturer, to the no-fault system. But, a moment's reflection will
reveal that this situation breeds little injustice. The worker's com-
pensation system, which was established to provide limited recovery
Remedy Rule?" The answer to this question, which by inference leads to the conclusion
that probably employer fault was involved, resulted in 50.1% affirmative and 49.9%
negative answers. When the question was phrased to reflect the % of claims with
reference to total dollars paid out, the breakdown was 56.3% affirmative and 43.7%
negative. The disparity is explained in that the insured is somewhat more likely to
have impleaded the employer, but for the Sole Remedy Rule, in the bigger cases. This
indication was corroborated by the fact that the average payment was about 29%
larger in cases when the answer to the question set forth above was in the affirmative.
See id. at 67, Table 10-2.
149. But see American Insurance Association, supra note 146, at 66-67.
150. PROSSER, supra note 43, at § 50.
151. See Davis, The Interaction of Workers' Compensation and Products Liabili-
ty, 15 TRIAL 31, 33 (1979).
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for a work related injury, would, in fact, be paying for a work-
related injury. To deny the employer who was truly not at fault his
third-party action, may be somewhat unfair. But, it does not violate
basic principles of fairness to recognize that when a no-fault system
operates side-by-side with a fault system, it is best to permit each
system to work separately."5 2 There are methods available to assure
that only the truly non-negligent employer is granted the full subro-
gation lien and that the negligent employer be deprived of that por-
tion of the subrogation lien which represents the employer's fault
contribution."5 3 But, these methods would require that fault be tried
and apportioned between the employer and manufacturer to assure
that the employer does not receive more than his equitable share
back in the contribution action. Such an approach would not only in-
crease transaction costs, it would also present difficult apportion-
ment questions for jury resolution in the workplace setting where
fault apportionment may be more difficult to accomplish. 5'
Finally, it should be noted that those who could be expected to
oppose the abolition of the subrogation lien (the workers compensa-
tion insurers) have led the fight for this portion of the statute.' 55
Subrogation practice against product manufacturers constitutes a
very small part of a huge worker's compensation system. The trans-
action costs imposed on worker's compensation insurers who have
party status thrust on them, if they are to have a hand in proving
fault or defect on the part of the manufacturer, is substantial. Thus,
the American Insurance Association has taken the position that the
sacrifice of the worker's compensation lien, if coupled with the
assurance that the worker's compensation system cannot be invaded
by a contribution action from manufacturers," is in line with its
own interests.
152. This debate is of ancient vintage. See James, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1941); Gregory, Contribu-
tion Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (1941). The argument
in favor of the James position is stronger when contribution is being sought across two
different liability systems.
153. See American Insurance Association, supra note 146, at 72-74; UPLL, supra
note 28, § 113 at 3001.
154. Id.
155. As long as Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., 259 Iowa
314, 114 N.W.2d 303 (1966) (IPALCO) is the governing rule, the employer bears no
liability providing the employer retains subrogation or reimbursement rights. See
Davis, Third Party Tortfeasors' Rights Where Compensation Covered Employers are
Negligent- Where Do Dole and Sunspan Lead, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571, 592 (Appendix I
indicates that the majority of states follow IPALCO).
156. It should be noted that Senate Bill, § 11(C) would prohibit the comparative
fault contribution action allowed by Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282
N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) and Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division, Inc., 70 Ill.
2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977).
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This proposal would respond to the outcry of manufacturers. It
would not cost claimants one farthing.'57 The only group that could
conceivably be opposed to this proposal are the worker's compensa-
tion insurers. However, for reasons of economy they are also strongly
in favor of its adoption. If all are in favor and none are opposed, Sec-
tion 11 should be as popular as apple pie and as respectable as
motherhood. There is no good reason for its elimiation from the
Senate Bill.' It is a low profile solution to a rather high profile pro-
blem-the very kind of legislation that should be enacted at the na-
tional level.'59
The problem with Section 11 is not Section 11; it is Sections
10(a)(1) and 10(b)(1). They provide in the case of misuse, alteration or
modification of the product "by the employer of the claimant or by
any co-employee of the claimant" that "damages shall be reduced by
(A) the amount determined under Section 11(a), if that section is ap-
plicable; or (B) the percentage of responsibility apportioned to the
employer or employee, whichever is greater."'' 0 This formulation
will free the manufacturer from joint-tortfeasor liability and will in
most cases require an innocent plaintiff to bear a significant part of
the loss caused by the joint negligence of the employer and the
manufacturer.
The argument is made that the quid pro quo for a no-fault
worker's compensation system was limited recovery. Thus, when the
percentage of fault is ascertained, it is not unjust to deprive the
employee of that percentage of the claim which reflects the
employer's contribution to the injury.' The short answer to this
argument is that what we are dealing with in Sections 10(a)(1) and
10(b)(1) is not the employer's limited liability, but that of the
defendant-manufacturer. The employee struck no bargain with him,
and there is no good reason to deprive the plaintiff of a defendant
with joint-tortfeasor liability.
Putting aside the fairness question, the practical problems attend-
ing the implementation of Sections 10(a) and (b) are overwhelming.
157. But see Davis, supra note 155, at 60.
158. I do not mean to denigrate from the strong arguments made against the
proposal by Professor Clifford Davis. See Davis, supra notes 151 and 157. The point
made here is that the institutional defendants who could be expected to oppose a solu-
tion which permits them to shed their present liabilities have opted for a change which
increases their liability.
159. The position taken by the Reagan administration endorses the principle of
federal products liability legislation but opposes any provisions that would effect such
firmly entrenched state programs as workers' compensation. Memorandum from Craig
L. Fuller (July 15, 1982) (available from the Dep't of Commerce) (cabinet discussion on
federal products liability legislation).
160. Senate Bill §§ 10(a)(1), 10(b)(1).
161. See UPLA, supra note 1, § 114 and Analysis at 62,741.
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As noted earlier, Section 9 and Sections 10(a) and (b) create a two-
track system which differentiate product misuse and alteration from
other forms of negligent conduct."7 In the case of the former, joint-
tortfeasor liability is eliminated; in the latter it is retained. Thus,
every employment injury case will demand judicial interpretation of
the conduct to detect whether it meets one category or the other.
Another logistic problem that will be encountered concerns the
relationship between plaintiff-fault and the severed joint-tortfeasor.
Consider a case where plaintiff is 30% at fault, the employer 40% at
fault and the defendant-manufacturer 30% at fault. Under Section 9,
plaintiffs recovery will "reduce any damages awarded to the claim-
ant in an amount proportionate to the responsibility of the
claimant." '163 But, consider that the defendant-manufacturer is now
only 30% at fault. Thus, the claimant has an award against the
manufacturer for only 30% of the total damages. Since the
claimant's damages must be reduced by 30%, bcause that is the
percentage of his fault, the plaintiff may presumably recover
nothing from the defendant-manufacturer!"" Was this the intent of
the drafters?
Even if a more moderate interpretation is adopted in which
plaintiffs recovery is reduced by a percentage, which is a pro rata
share of plaintiffs fault as compared with the defendant's fault, "'
the reality is that plaintiffs recovery against a severed joint-
tortfeasor will be reduced to account for the comparative fault doc-
trine. Was this interaction between Section 9 and Sections 10(a) and
10(b) considered by the authors of the bill?
Finally, Congress will not pass legislation destroying joint-
tortfeasor liability in the employment setting without assuring itself
that claimants will not be left with the burden of a significant
percentage of the loss. In those states where worker's compensation
recovery is more generous, the likelihood of employees carrying a
significant percentage of their loss is sharply reduced. In those
states whose provisions are less than adequate, the danger is great
that employees will carry this burden. For Congress to act, it would
first have to satisfy itself as to the adequacy of the various worker's-
compensation systems. More likely, there would be pressure to set
minimum standards that would apply to all states. It is unlikely that
162. See supra text accompanying notes 123-32.
163. Senate Bill § 9(a).
164. If Sec. 9 is interpreted to reflect the total damages as a percentage figure
equaling 100% then plaintiff will have his damage reduced by 30% of the total. This
would net him zero recovery.
165. Thus, defendant's 30% would be translated into a dollar figure and plaintiff
would recover 70% of the defendant's assessed damages. Those damages are only 21%
of the total damages incurred.
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in this age of "new federalism," Congress will act to provide for
minimum state worker's compensation standards. Thus, for manufac-
turers to "shoot for the moon" on this issue is to insure that Con-
gress will take no action at all. Again, a more modest and less sensa-
tionalist approach to this problem is far more likely to succeed. The
French adage that "a little less would be a whole lot more" applies
accurately to this situation.
VIII. THE OUTLINE FOR SENSIBLE FEDERAL LEGISLATION
As indicated throughout this Article, S. 2631 and H.R. 5214 are
far too complex. By proposing to deal with the entirety of tort law
as it affects product liability litigation, the bills have created enor-
mous interpretative problems. It is simply not possible to compress
the entirety of the law of torts into 15-20 pages of legislation.
Furthermore, the proposed legislation would radically differentiate
product liability law from the remainder of tort law. 6" This would
mean that two systems of law would deal differently with problems
that are similar in nature. One cannot introduce such schizophrenia
into a legal system without putting in question the integrity of
either one or the other system. If, for example, joint-tortfeasor
liability is to be eliminated based on the theory of proportional fault
there is no good reason to protect only manufacturers." 7 Other
166. Different standards would be applied for products liability in contradistinc-
tion to normal tort law in such areas as:
a. sufficiency of expert testimony, Senate Bill § 4(c);
b. collateral estoppel Senate Bill § 4(d)(1);
c. reasonable conduct to discover risk information, Senate Bill § 5(b)(1);
d. the establishment of custom as defense, Senate Bill §§ 2(8), 5(b)(2);
e. special standards for risk-utility analysis, Senate Bill § 5(c)(2);
f. limitation of the proximate cause doctrine in failure to warn cases,
Senate Bill § 6(b)(2);
g. elimination of failure to warn for foreseeable misconduct, Senate Bill
§ 6(d)(2);
h. limiting the joint-tortfeasor doctrine by delaying recovery until uncollec-
tibility is established, Senate Bill § 9(d);
i. reducing plaintiff's recovery from the remaining tortfeasor by
reallocating to account for his fault in the case of an uncollectible judg-
ment against one tortfeasor, Senate Bill § 9(d);
j. eliminating joint-tortfeasor recovery when misconduct is "misuse or
alteration" but not other conduct, Senate Bill §§ 10(a)(1), 10(b)(1);
k. reducing recovery by percentage of "cause" rather than fault, Senate
Bill §§ 10(a)(1), 10(b)(1);
1. eliminating joint-tortfeasor liability in the case of employer misconduct
when that conduct constitutes misuse or alteration, Senate Bill
§§ 10(a)(1), 10(b)(1);
m. statutes of repose, Senate Bill § 12; and
n. limitation of punitive damages, Senate bill § 13.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 123-132. Several states have abolished
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defendants in nonproduct cases should be entitled to similar protec-
tion. If there are to be special rules developed for issues arising
from advanced technology,"" then not only product manufacturers,
but the medical and engineering professions should be the
beneficiaries of such rules as well. The law of torts should not be
rendered into a bag of rules which has the consistentcy of chop-suey.
The solution then, is not to rewrite the law of torts, but to
target specific problem areas that are peculiar to product liability
litigation and to seek to resolve them as simply as possible so that
we do not create layer upon layer of textual complexity that will in-
evitably confuse the law for the forseeable future. If this tack were
followed, the preemption provisions of the legislation would not
speak to the entirety of products litigation, but only to those issues
which are directly covered by the Act."9 What subjects should be
covered by legislation? The introduction set forth the basic struc-
ture for federal legislation in this area. The following paragrpahs
will expand on that brief outline and delineate the scope of the pro-
posed legislation.
A. Design Defect and Failure to Warn - Negligence
Not Strict Liability
Federal legislation should clearly provide that in cases of design
defect and failure to warn, a manufacturer is liable if at the time of
manufacture or at some later time it failed to act as a "reasonably
prudent manufacturer in the same or similar circumstances."'70 The
negligence standard is well known to the courts. It is based on
foresight not hindsight. 7 ' There is no necessity to create an intricate
web of rules dealing with "unavoidably dangerous" products,
technological feasibility, etc. There is no question that the intent of
the legislation is to eliminate strict liability from design and failure
to warn cases.' The legislation should provide that the burden of
the joint-tortfeasor doctrine after adoption of the comparative fault principle. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1976); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1979).
168. Senate Bill §§ 5(b)(2), 2(8), 4(b).
169. This would require a restructuring of the preemption provision, Senate Bill§ 3.
170. Senate Bill § 5(b) would suffice if it would conclude at the end of the first
sentence. It would be better, however, to frame the language in simple
negligence-conduct language, rather than focus on the "unreasonably dangerous"
nature of the product.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398; Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.
3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629; Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187
(E.D. La. 1969).
172. If negligence would be the exclusive doctrine for design and failure to warn
cases there would be no need to include a provision governing subsequent remedial
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proof in such cases is on the claimant.' By the enactment of these
provisions, cases such as Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,"' Azzerello
v. Black Bros., Phillips v. Kimwood, 1 ' and Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prod. Corp.,' would be overruled.
The negligence test would establish negligence, not consumer
expectations, as the operative rule for design and warning cases.
There are potential problems with eliminating the consumer expec-
tation test from design litigation. Recent cases such as Leichthamer
v. American Motors Corp.1 8 demonstrate that the "consumer expec-
tation" theory has considerable utility and substantive validity. 9
However, utopian justice should give way to a simple and easily
understandable standard. A simple across the board negligence test
for design and failure to warn cases which will clarify the law seems
desirable even if more finely tuned doctrine must be sacrificed.
Similarly, simplicity would be fostered if legislation would not speak
at all to the "production defect" question."w That subject is not the
object of controversy and does not need legislative reform.
As this paper is going to press, the business community is reel-
ing from the announcement that Johns-Manville has filed for
Chapter XI reorganization as a result of the asbestos litigation.'"
measures. Senate Bill § 14. The common law rule which prohibits the introduction of
subsequent repair evidence would govern as it does in all negligence cases. This would
permit a court to admit subsequent repair evidence in production defect cases. See
Caprara v. Chrysler Corp. 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
Although, this author has challenged the wisdom of Caprara, see, Twerski, Post-
Accident Design Modification Evidence in a Manufacturing Defect Setting: Strict
Liability and Beyond, 4 J. OF PROD. LIABILITY 143 (1981), there are no grounds for
freezing the subsequent repair rule into statutory language, thus limiting the
legitimate flexibility of courts.
173. Perhaps the most improvident judicial pronouncement on burden of proof
was the ruling of Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225. See Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product
Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773
(1979).
174. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
175. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
176. 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
177. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
178. 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
179. In Leicthamer the manufacturer of a Jeep vehicle that pitched forward and
overturned while descending a hill was held liable for second collision injuries when
the roll-bar collapsed. A significant aspect of the court's reasoning was its reliance on a
consumer expectation test. The court found that advertising encouraged driving down
steep hills and the ability of the car to maneuver rough terrain safely. It is clear that
the majority predicated liability on the consumer expectation theory and did not re-
quire risk-utility evidence to establish defect. Cf. Keeton, supra note 34.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
181. N.Y. Times, supra note 101.
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Newspaper stories have made special note of the decision of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod.
Corp.8 ' which applied a true strict-liability standard to a failure-to-
warn asbestos case. That a manufacturer can be held liable even
though it neither knew nor had reason to know of the danger is a
proposition that has met with incredulity by the general populace.
The Beshada holding probably had little actual effect on the Johns-
Mansville litigation. Most of the cases had been established on negli-
gence grounds."8 3 Nonetheless, it is clear that there exists a national
consensus that liability in design and warning cases should be fault-
based. Federal legislation is clearly appropriate on this issue.
Much more troubling is whether the "reasonableness" standard
should be given further definition by attempting to formulate rules
to limit the discretion of courts as to the kinds of cases that should
be sent to a jury. As noted earlier, the standards offered in the pro-
posed legislation are flawed and subject to substantial misinterpre-
tation."' Although it would be best to accomplish jury control by uti-
lizing an evidentiary standard, a standard which accurately reflects
risk-utility analysis and suggests to the courts that they have a
primary responsibility to satisfy themselves that the evidence has
addressed the crucial factors in a truly credible fashion is accep-
table. However, risk-utility standards which isolate single factors for
examination and make satisfaction of that particular factor a sina
qua non for recovery are not acceptable. 5
B. Statutes of Repose
Federal legislation should include a statute of repose. It has
been argued that the old product cases constitute a very small part
of the total liability picture and are therefore not a significant factor
in the present crisis.8 8 However, when they do arise, the cases
breed great resentment on the part of manufacturers. These cases
are often accompanied by product misuse, abuse, lack of adequate
repair and substantial alteration. In addition, these cases often re-
flect changing societal standards with regard to safety.8 Thus, even
if the legal standard applied is negligence, as a practical matter,
182. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
183. See cases cited supra note 101.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 57-70.
185. See supra notes 46, 58, 66 and text accompanying notes 57-70 for sugges-
tions that would give courts greater control over the directed verdict issue.
186. See UPLL, supra note 28, § 109 Analysis at 3008-09.
187. See Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension, 69 CALIF. L, REv. 919
(1981); Twerski, Rebuilding the CitadeL. The Legislative Assault on the Common Law,
supra note 12, at 58.
[Vol. 18
PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATION
juries cannot divest themselves of their present attitudes and wind
their mental clocks back in time. In actuality they apply a modified
strict liability standard.
A 20 year statute of repose which applies to both capital and
consumer goods is perferable. The statute should include an excep-
tion identical to that set forth in Section 12(b) which states that the
statute of repose is not applied if:
(1) the manufacturer or product seller intentionally misrep-
resented facts about the product or fraudulently concealed
information about the product, and that conduct was a sub-
stantial cause of the harm;
(2) the harm of the claimant was caused by the cumulative
effect of prolonged exposure to a defective product; or
(3) the harm caused within the period referred to in subsec-
tion (a) (the 20 year repose period), did not manifest itself until
the expiration of that period.'88
There are those who would argue for a longer period with re-
gard to capital goods due to their known longevity. The way to deal
with this problem may be to add a section which focuses on the rep-
resentations about longevity and product life made by the manu-
facturer.'89 Even Section 2-725(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.)' 9 specifically excepts from the operation of the statute of
limitation, a warranty which "explicitly extends to future perfor-
mance." Manfacturers should not be able to market longevity and
hide from their marketing representations when a liability claim
arises.
It should be noted that the statute as presently written extends
the statute of repose for express and implied warranty action from
four years under Section 2-7251(1) of the U.C.C.,'9' to either 25 years
(or ten years under the alternative to section 12 in S. 2631). This
was probably not intended by the drafters and demonstrates once
again the high cost that attends a total preemption provision.
188. Senate Bill § 12(b).
189. The problem in this area is that the law of express warranty tends to deal
with explicit representations. Manufacturers are not prone to make specific represen-
tations about longevity, rather they rely on "code" words to convey to consumers that
their products are well nigh indestructible. There is certainly a keen awareness that a
thriving market exists in used-capitol machinery, and that its resale value is a signifi-
cant factor in its original purchase price. On the other hand, there is a real unfairness
in holding a manufacturer liable for a machine that has been to hell and back. Thus,
the suggestion is that the 20 year statute of repose govern unless the manufacturer
has, through marketing, affirmatively led consumers to believe that it has a longer
lifespan.
190. U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
191. Id. at § 2-725(1).
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The proposed statute of repose should cover consumer goods as
well. It is a rare consumer good that functions past 20 years. It
would simplify matters to implement a single statute of limitations
and avoid definitional problems.
Section 12(d) of S. 2631 limits the cause of action to no more than
two years from the time the claimant discovered, or with due dili-
gence should have discovered, the harm.'92 This provision is in line
with many state statutes.'93 A discovery statute will aid consumers
in those jurisdictions in which the statute of limitations begins run-
ning from the time that the harm occurred. 94 The two-year provision
is shorter than some state provisions' but is clearly reasonable.
Shortening the statute of limitations is a small sacrifice to make for
a uniform discovery statute.
C. Punitive Damages
Section 13 of S. 2631 sets forth vigorous standards for the im-
position of punitive damages. 96 Punitive damage awards that are un-
justified threaten the entire structure of product liability litigation.
As Professor Owen has so cogently argued, the process of risk-utility
balancing requires the manufacturer to address risk and utility fac-
tors and to consciously balance them.'97 If any time a jury disagrees
with the balance that is struck and a manufaturer is exposed to pun-
itive damages, then we shall drive the balancing process under-
ground. Furthermore, it is simply unfair to defendant-manufacturers
to ask them to balance safety, utility, esthetics and cost, and then to
censure them with punitive damages merely because we disagree
with their assessment. It is altogether too easy, after the fact, to
dredge up an in-house memorandum in which cost factors are hon-
estly considered, and utilize it as "smoking gun" evidence of the
defendants' evil intent. The argument that the manufacturer "traded
your life for a dollar in profit" has great jury appeal. 9 Courts must
exercise heavy control in this emotion laden area precisely because
192. Senate Bill § 12(d). House Bill § 12(a) provides for a three year statute of
limitations.
193. See, e.g. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, § 213(d) (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(b))
(two years). Other states provide for a slightly longer period. See infra note 195.
194. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2803; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(1); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.905(1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a). See also Thornton v. Roosevelt
Hospital, 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920.
195. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-57.7a(a) (three years); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-D:2(I) (three years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(3) (three years).
196. Senate Bill § 13.
197. See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufac-
turers of Defective Products, supra note 22, at 16-19.
198. Id. at 12-16.
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the issues which support punitive damages are so closely allied to
the issues which support legitimate or close to legitimate risk-utility
decision making.
Some careful thought should be given to the provisions on puni-
tive damages set forth in H.R. 5214.1" Sections 11(d) and (e) of that
bill provide for a cap on punitive damages not to exceed $1 million
dollars for any one claimant or $5 million dollars for all claims."' The
single claim cap is very reasonable. The $5 million dollar (or 5/0 of
net worth) cap permits punitive damages up to the amount of litiga-
tion expenses, including reasonable attorney fees."° As a practical
matter, this would allow for punitive damages somewhat in excess
of one-third in most personal injury cases. 2 It is hard to character-
ize limitations on punitive damages as unfair. Since by definition
compensatory damages have already been awarded to the claimant,
all that one can say is that the reduced punitive damage means that
the defendant will not be punished with sufficient severity. That
presupposes, however, that punitive damages are a measured re-
sponse to culpability. Ofttimes, flagrant behavior will escape any
sanction simply because damage has not ensued, while behavior less
serious will have devastating consequences. Given the almost hit
and miss quality that attends punitive damages there is no good rea-
son for opposing the capping provision suggested by H.R. 5214. There
is some unfairness in permitting the first several plaintiffs to re-
cover up to $1 million dollars in punitive damages and limiting later
claimants to their litigation expenses. But, this might be justified in
that the enterprennurial risk of early claimants who must break
new ground is worthy of an extra bonus.
In short, the risk of crushing liability as a result of punitive
damages is too great. It threatens the business community with the
199. House Bill § 11.
200. House Bill §§ 11(d) and (e) provide:
(d) The amount of punitive damages that may be recovered by one claimant
may not exceed, but may be less than, twice the amount of actual
damages the claimant is determined to have suffered, but in no event
shall an award of punitive damages exceed $1 million for any one claim-
ant.(e) If the product seller proves that it has previously paid or been finally
adjudicated liable for punitive damages and fines totaling the lesser of
$5,000,000 or 5 per centum of its net worth, its liability for punitive
damages shall not exceed the lesser of-
(1) claimant's litigation expenses, including reasonable attorneys'
fees; or
(2) the amount determined under subsection (d).
201. Id.
202. In most personal injury cases the contingent fee is one-third of the damages
awarded. If one included out-of-pocket disbursements, the figure could exceed one-
third by a considerable amount.
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legal equivalent of an atom bomb. It places the entire product liabil-
ity system in jeopardy of runaway unregulated verdicts. It deserves
a clear-cut federal solution.
D. Comparative Responsibility
In an earlier section it was suggested that comparative fault be
established as the norm, subject to exceptions to be formulated by
the courts."° The discussion set forth above explains the rationale
for permitting the courts to exercise some discretion in this area.
E. Worker's Compensation
An earlier section expresses dissatisfaction with the way S. 2631
has dealt with this problem and sets forth the suggestion that the
legislation be limited to the items in Section 11. ' It would provide
for an easily understandable rule which would meet the interests of
all the major constituencies.
IX. CONCLUSION
Despite the considerable length of this article, it does not pro-
vide a complete analysis of all sections of S. 2631. A work, again the
length of this paper, would be necessary to accomplish that goal. My
purpose has been to demonstrate that a comprehensive product lia-
bility code which speaks to all aspects of the cause of action is un-
wise and unworkable. Proponents of federal legislation will have to
choose between legislation that directs itself to those pressing
issues which are most amenable to simple legislative correction and
the more ambitious and complex legislation. Complex legislation will
ultimately cause so much confusion that businessmen and consumers
will rue the day it was passed. For the short run it would behoove
those who seek to foster the interests of the business community to
ask themselves whether their efforts should be directed toward sup-
porting legislation which, because of its complexity and substantive
unfairness, has little chance of being enacted into law. Thier efforts
would be better directed in helping fashion sharply focused legisla-
tion that would alleviate the truly vexing problems that attend
product liability litigation.
Editor's Note: S. 2631 [S. Rep. No. 97-670] was reported out of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on December 1, 1982. Although the bill was
modified somewhat to soften or eliminate some of the harsh provisions present in the
original draft, the Bill in essence, remains a product liability code. The substance of
the author's critique remains, in our opinion, essentially unchanged.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 132-45.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 146-63.
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Appendix A
97th CONGRESS S.2631
2D SESSION
To regulate interstate commerce by providing for a uniform product
liability law,
and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JUNE 16 (legislative day, JUNE 8), 1982
MR. KASTEN (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. ABDNOR, Mr. PERCY, Mr. GARN,
Mr. STAFFORD, and Mr. GLENN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
A BILL
To regulate interstate commerce by providing for a uniform
product liability law, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled
SHORT TITLE
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Product Liability Act".
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 2. As used in this Act-
(1) "claimant" means any person who brings a product liability
action, and if such an action is brought through or on behalf of an
estate, the term includes the claimant's decedent, or if such an action
is brought through or on behalf of a minor, the term includes the
claimant's parent or guardian;
(2) "clear and convincing evidence" is that measure or degree of
proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief
or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established; the level of proof required to satisfy this standard is
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more than that required under preponderance of the evidence, but
less than that required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
(3) "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce or transportation
(A) between a place in a State and any place outside of that State; or
(B) which affects trade, commerce, or transportation described in
clause (A);
(4) "express warranty" means any affirmation of fact, promise,
or description relating to a product;
(5) "harm" means (A) physical damage to property other than the
product itself; (B) personal physical injury, illness, or death of the
claimant; or (C) mental anguish or emotional harm of the claimant
caused by the claimant's personal physical injury, illness or death;
"harm" does not include commercial loss;
(6) "manufacturer" means (A) any person who is engaged in a
business to produce, make, or construct any product (or component
part of a product), including a product seller, distributor, or retailer
of products with respect to any product to the extent that such a
product seller, distributor, or retailer produces, makes, or constructs
the product before that product seller, distributor, or retailer sells
the product; or (B) any product seller not described in clause (A)
which holds itself out as a manufacturer to the user of the product;
(7) "person" means any individual, corporation, company, associa-
tion, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or any other en-
tity (including any governmental entity);
(8) "practical technological feasibility" means the technical and
scientific knowledge relating to the safety of a product which, at the
time of manufacture of a product, was developed, available and
capable of use or implementation in the manufacture of a product,
and economically feasible for use by a manufacturer;
(9) "preponderance of the evidence" is that measure or degree of
proof which, by the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side, establishes that it is more probable than not
that a fact occurred or did not occur;
(10) "product" means any object, substance, or raw material
which is capable of delivery itself, or as an assembled whole or as a
component part and is produced for introduction into trade or com-
merce; "product" does not include human tissue or organs;
(11) "product seller" means a person who, in the course of a
business conducted for that purpose, sells, distributes, leases, in-
-stalls, prepares, packages, labels, markets, repairs, maintains, or
otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of com-
merce; but does not include-
(A) a seller of real property;
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(B) a provider of professional services in any case in which
the sale or use of a product is incidental to the transaction
and the essence of the transaction is the furnishing of judg-
ment, skill, or services; or
(C) any person who-
(i) acts in only a financial capacity with respect to the
sale of a product; and
(ii) leases a product under a lease arrangement in
which the selection, possession, maintenance, and opera-
tion of the product are controlled by a person other than
the lessor;
(12) "product user" means any person, including the claimant's
employer, who owns, operates, or has control of a product;
(13) "reasonably anticipated conduct" means the conduct which
would be expected of a reasonably prudent person who is likely to
use the product in the same or similar circumstances; and
(14) "State" means any State of the United States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other territory or posses-
sion of the United States.
PREEMPTION OF OTHER LAWS
SEC. 3.(a) Any civil action brought against a manufacturer or
product seller for harm caused by a product is a product liability action.
This Act governs any civil action for harm caused by a product, in-
cluding any action which before the effective date of this Act would
have been based on: (1) strict or absolute liability in tort; (2)
negligence or gross negligence; (3) breach of express or implied war-
ranty; (4) failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct; or (5) any
other theory that is the basis for an award for damages for harm
caused by a product.
(b) No person may recover for any loss or damage caused by a
product except to the extent that the loss or damage constitutes
harm. A civil action for loss or damage caused to a product itself or
for commercial loss is not a product liability action, and shall be
governed by applicable commercial or contract law.
(c) This Act supersedes any State law regarding matters gov-
erned by this Act.
(d) The district courts of the United States shall not have
jurisdiction over any civil action arising under this Act, based on
sections 1331 or 1337 of title 28, United States Code.
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RESPONSIBILITY OF MANUFACTURERS
SEC. 4(a) In any product liability action, a manufacturer is liable
to a claimant if-
(1) The claimant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that-
(A) the product was unreasonably dangerous in construc-
tion, as defined in section 5(a);
(B) the product was unreasonably dangerous in design, as
defined in section 5(b);
(C) the product was unreasonably dangerous because the
manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings or instruc-
tions about a danger connected with the product or about
the proper use of the product, as defined in section 6; or
(D) the product was unreasonably dangerous because the
product did not conform to an express warranty made by the
manufacturer with respect to the product, as defined in sec-
tion 7;
(2) the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the individual product unit which allegedly caused the harm
complained of was manufactured by the defendant; and
(3) the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the product was a
proximate cause of the harm complained of by the claimant.
(b) The claimant must introduce sufficient evidence to allow
a reasonable person, by a preponderance of the evidence, to make
the determinations specified in subsection (a). Expert opinion is not
considered sufficient evidence to support a proposition of fact unless
it is supported or corrobroated by sound objective evidence.
(c) If the claimant has introduced sufficient evidence to
allow a reasonable person, by a preponderance of the evidence, to
make all the determinations specified in subsection (a) with the ex-
ception of the determination specified in subsection (a)(2), the prod-
uct liability action nevertheless may be submitted to the trier of
fact for a determination of the manufacturer's liability if the clai-
mant proves by clear and convincing evidence and if the court finds
that-
(1) the claimant made every reasonable effort to establish
the identity of the manufacturer of the product unit which
allegedly caused the harm complained of;
(2) the claimant has brought the product liability action
against every manufacturer which could have produced, made, or
constructed the product unit which allegedly caused the harm
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complained of; and
(3) each of the manufacturers against whom the action is
brought is in a better position because of superior knowledge or
information than the claimant to establish which manufacturer
actually produced, made, or constructed the product unit which
allegedly caused the harm complained of.
(d)(1) A claimant may not establish any fact necessary to make
the determinations described in subsection (a) by showing that the
identical issue of fact was determined adversely to the manufacturer
in another action by another claimant unless both actions were based
on harm caused by the same event in which two or more persons
were harmed.
(2) A manufacturer may not establish any fact necessary to
make the determinations described in subsection (a) by showing that
the identical issue of fact was determined adversely to another
claimant in another action against that manufacturer unless both ac-
tions were based on harm caused by the same event in which two or
more person were harmed.
PRODUCT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
SEC. 5. (a) A product is unreasonably dangerous in construction
if, when the product left the control of the manufacturer, it deviated
in a material way -
(1) from the design specification or performance standards of
the manufacturer; or
(2) from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
(b) A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time
of manufacture of the product, a reasonably prudent manufacturer
in the same or similar circumstances would not have used the design
that the manufacturer used. A product is not unreasonably
dangerous in design unless-
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on knowledge which
has sound support in the scientific, technical, or medical com-
munity for the existence of the danger which caused the claim-
ant's harm, should have known about the danger which allegedly
caused the claimant's harm; and
(2) a means to eliminate the danger that caused the harm
was within practical technological feasibility.
(c) A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design if the
harm was caused by an unavoidably dangerous aspect of a product.
As used in this paragraph, an "unavoidably dangerous aspect"
means that aspect of a product which could not in light of
knowledge which had sound support in the scientific, technical, or
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medical community at the time of manufacture, have been
eliminated without seriously impairing the effectiveness with which
the product performs its intended function or the desirability,
economic and otherwise, of the product to the person who uses or
consumes it.
(d) If an alternative design is offered as evidence that a product
was unreasonably dangerous in design, a product is not
unreasonably dangerous in design unless the claimant establishes
that, at the time of the manufacture of the product-
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on sound support in
the scientific, technical, or medical community for the existence
of the alternative design, should have known about the alter-
native design; and
(2) the alternative design would have-
(A) utilized only science and technology for which there
was sound scientific, technical or medical support and which
was within practical and technological feasibility;
(B) provided better safety with regard to the particular
hazard which caused the claimant's harm and equivalent or
better overall safety then the chosen design. The overall
safety of the alternative design is better than the chosen
design if the hazards it eliminates are greater than any new
hazards it creates for any persons and for any uses and
(C) been desirable, functionally, economically, and other-
wise, to the person who uses or consumes it.
PRODUCT WARNINGS OR INSTRUCTIONS
SEC. 6. (a) A product is unreasonably dangerous because of the
failure of the manufacturer to provide warnings or instructions
about a danger connected with the product or about the proper use
of the product if-
(1) necessary warnings or instructions were not provided,
under subsection (b); or
(2) postmanufacture warnings or instructions were not pro-
vided, under subsection (c).
(b) A product is unreasonably dangerous for lack of necessary
warnings or instructions if the claimant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product was
sold -
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on sound support in the
scientific, technical, or medical community for the existence of
the danger which caused the claimant's harm, should have
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known about the danger which allegedly caused the claimant's
harm;
(2) the manufacturer failed to provide the warnings or in-
structions that a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the same
or similar circumstances would have provided with respect to
the danger which caused the harm alleged by the claimant,
given the liklihood that the product would cause harm of the
type alleged by the claimant and given the seriousness of that
harm;
(3) the manufacturer failed to provide to the claimant or to
another person in accordance with subsection (d)(1) such warn-
ings or instructions which the claimant alleges would have been
adequate; and
(4) the warnings or instructions which the claimant alleges
would have been adequate, if provided, would have led a
reasonably prudent product user either to decline to use the pro-
duct or to use it in a manner so as to avoid harm of the type
alleged by the claimant.
(c)(1) A product is unreasonably dangerous for lack of postman-
ufacture warnings or instructions if the claimant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that-
(A) after the product was manufactured, the manufacturer
knew or, based on sound support in the scientific, technical, or
medical community for the existence of the danger which caused
the claimant's harm, should have known about the danger which
allegedly caused the claimant's harm; and
(B) postmanufacture warnings or instructions would have
been provided by a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the
same or similar circumstances, given the likelihood that the pro-
duct would cause harm of the type alleged by the claimant and
given the seriousness of that harm.
(2) A product is not unreasonably dangerous under this
paragraph if the manufacturer made reasonable efforts to provide
postmanufacture warnings or instructions to a product user or to
another person, in accordance with subsection (d)(1).
(d)(1) A product is not unreasonably dangerous for lack of necessary
or postmanufacture warnings or instructions if those warnings or in-
structions were provided to-
(A) a person, including an employer, who could reasonably
have been expected to assure that action would be taken to
avoid the harm or that the risk of harm would be explained to
the actual product user;
(B) the using or supervising expert, where the product in-
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volved is one which may be legally used only by or under the
supervision of a class of experts. For purposes of this clause,
warnings or instructions are considered provided to the using or
supervising expert where the manufacturer employed means
reasonably calculated to make them available to the expert, and
this does not require actual, personal notice to the expert; or
(C) the manufacturer's immediate buyer-(i) where the product was sold as a component or mater-
ial to be incorporated into another product and the claimant
was exposed to the component or material after it was incor-
porated or converted into another product;
(ii) where the product was used in a workplace and there
was no practical feasible means of transmitting warnings or
instructions directly to the claimant; or
(iii) where the claimant was not an employee of the
manufacturer's immediate buyer and there was no practical
or feasible means of transmitting the warnings or instruc-
tions to the claimant.
(2) A product is not unreasonably dangerous for lack of warn-
ings or instructions ragarding-
(A) dangers that are obvious. As used in this clause,
"dangers that are obvious" are those of which a reasonably pru-
dent product user or a person identified in subsection (d)(1), if
applicable, would have been aware without a warning or instruc-
tion and dangers which were a matter of common knowledge to
persons in the same or similar position as the claimant;
(B) the consequences of product misuse, as defined in section
10(a)(2), or use contrary to warnings or instructions available to
the user or to a person identified in subsection (d)(1), if ap-
plicable; or
(C) alterations or modifications, as defined in section 10(b)(2),
of the product which do not constitute reasonably anticipated
conduct on the part of the product user.
PRODUCT FAILURE TO CONFORM TO EXPRESS WARRANTY
SEC. 7. (a) A product is unreasonably dangerous because it did
not conform to an express warranty if-
(1) the manufacturer made an express warranty about a
material fact relating to the safe performance of the product;
(2) this express warranty proved to be untrue; and
(3) the failure of the product to conform to the warranty
caused the harm.
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As used in this subsection, "material fact" means any specific
characteristic or quality of the product, but does not include a
general opinion about, or general praise of, the product or its quality.
(b) A product may be unreasonably dangerous for failure to con-
form to an express warranty although the manufacturer did not
engage in negligent or fraudulent conduct in making the express
warranty.
RESPONSIBILITY OF PRODUCT SELLERS
SEC. 8. (a) In any product liabililty action, a product seller is liable to
a claimant, if-
(1) the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the individual product unit which allegedly caused
the harm complained of was sold by the defendant and was a
proximate cause of the harm complained of by the claimant; and
(2) the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the product seller failed to exercise reasonable
care with respect to the product.
(b) In any product liability action, a product seller is liable to a
claimant if-
(1) the product seller made an express warranty, indepen-
dent of any express warranty made by a manufacturer as to the
same product, about a material fact directly relating to the safe
performance of the product;
(2) this express warranty proved to be untrue; and
(3) the failure of the product to conform to the warranty
caused the harm.
(c) The claimant must introduce sufficient evidence to allow a
reasonable person, by a preponderance of the evidence, to make the
determinations specified in subsections (a) and (b). Expert opinion is
not considered sufficient evidence to support a proposition of fact
unless it is supported or corroborated by sound objective evidence.
(d)(1) A claimant may not establish any fact necessary to make
the determinations described in subsection (a) and (b) by showing
that the identical issue of fact was determined adversely to the pro-
duct seller in another action brought by another claimant, unless
both actions were based on harm caused by the same event in which
two or more persons were harmed.
(2) A product seller may not establish any fact necessary to
make the determinations described in subsections (a) and (b) by
showing that the identical issue of fact was determined adversely to
another claimant in another action against that product seller unless
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both actions were based on harm caused by the same event in which
two or more persons were harmed.
(e)(1) In determining whether a product seller is subject to
liability under subsections (a) and (b), the trier of fact may consider
the effect of the conduct of the seller with respect to the construc-
tion, inspection, or condition of the product, and any failure of the
seller to transmit adequate warnings or instructions about the
dangers and proper use of the product.
(2) A product seller is under no obligation to open a prepackaged
product to inspect it, and is not liable under this section for failure
to open such a product.
(f) A product seller is liable for harm to the claimant caused by a
product in the same manner as the manufacturer of the product if-
(1) the manufacturer is not subject to service of process
under the laws of the State in which the action is brought; or
(2) the court determines that the claimant would be unable
to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer.
COMPARATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 9. (a) Comparative responsibility of the claimant shall not
bar recovery in a product liability action, but shall reduce any
damages awarded to the claimant in an amount proportionate to the
responsibility of the claimant. For purposes of this section, "com-
parative responsibility" means, with respect to a claimant, conduct
of the claimant involving negligence, contributory negligence or
assumption of risk.
(b) In any product liability action involving a claim of com-
parative responsibility, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all
parties, shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories (or,
if there is no jury, the court shall make findings) indicating (A) the
amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if
comparative responsibility were disregarded and (B) the percentage
of total responsibility for the claimant's harm to be allocated to each
claimant, to each defendant, to any third-party defendant, and to
any other person, including an employer or coemployee. For pur-
poses of this paragraph, the court may determine that two or more
persons are to be treated as a single person.
(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each
claimant in accordance with the findings made under subsection (b),
and shall enter judgment against each party determined to be liable
in proportion to the degree of responsibility.
(d) If a claimant has not been able to collect on a judgment in a
product liability action, and if the claimant makes a motion within 1
[Vol. 18
PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATION
year after the judgment is entered, the court shall determine
whether any part of the obligation allocated to a person who is a
party to the action is not collectable from such a person. Any
amount of obligation which the court determines is uncollectable
from that person shall be reallocated to the other persons who are
parties to the action and to whom responsibility was allocated and
to the claimant according to the respective percentages of their
responsibility, as determined under subsection (b).
MISUSE OR ALTERATION
SEC. 10. (a)(1) If a manufacturer or product seller proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that misuse of a product by any per-
son other than the manufacturer or product seller has caused the
claimant's harm, the claimant's damages shall be reduced or appor-
tioned to the extent that the misuse was a cause of the harm. If
misuse by the employer of the claimant or by any coemployee of the
claimant was a cause of the harm, damages shall be reduced by (A)
the amount determined under section 11(a), if that section is ap-
plicable; or (B) the percentage of responsibility apportioned to the
employer or coemployee, whichever is greater. Under this subsec-
tion, the trier of fact may determine that the harm caused by the
product occurred solely because of misuse of the product.
(2) For purposes of this Act, misuse shall be considered to occur
when a product is used for a purpose or in a manner which is not
consistent with the warnings or instructions available to the user, or
which is not consistent with reasonable practice of users of the prod-
uct, or when a product user fails adequately to train its employee in
the safe use of the product, or otherwise provide for the safe use of
the product, and that lack of training or the failure otherwise to pro-
vide for the safe use of the product was a cause of the claimant's
harm.
(b)(1) If a manufacturer or product seller proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that an alteration or modification of
the product by any person other than the manufacturer or product
seller has caused the claimant's harm, the damages of the claimant
shall be reduced or apportioned to the extent that the alteration or
modification was a cause of the harm. If alteration or modification
by the employer of the claimant or by any coemployee of the claim-
ant was a cause of the harm, damages shall be reduced by (A) the
amount determined under section 11(a), if that section is applicable;
or (B) the percentage of responsibility apportioned to the employer
or coemployee, whichever is greater. Under this subsection, the
trier of fact may determine that the harm arose solely because of
the product alteration or modification. Reduction or apportionment
under this subsection shall not be made if-
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(A) the alteration or modification was in accordance with in-
structions or specifications of the manufacturer or product
seller;
(B) the alteration or modification was made with the express
consent of the manufacturer or product seller; or
(C) the alteration or modification was reasonable anticipated
conduct, and the manufacturer or product seller failed to provide
adequate warnings or instructions with respect to that altera-
tion or modification.
(2) For purposes of this Act, alteration or modification shall be
considered to occur-
(A) when a person other than the manufacturer or product
seller changes the design, construction, or formula of the prod-
uct, or changes or removes warnings, instructions, or safety
devices that accompanied or were displayed on the product; or
(B) when a product user fails to observe the routine care and
maintenance necessary for a product and that failure was the
cause of the claimant's harm.
(3) Ordinary wear and tear of a product shall not be considered
to be alteration or modification of a product under this subsection.
EFFECT OF WORKER COMPENSATION BENEFITS
SEC. 11. (a) In any product liability action in which damages are
sought for harm for which the person injured is entitled to compen-
sation under any State or Federal worker compensation law, the
damages shall be reduced by the sum of (1) the amount paid as
worker compensation benefits for that harm; and (2) the present
value of all worker compensation benefits to which the employee is
or would be entitled for the harm. If a person eligible to file a claim
for worker compensation benefits has not filed such a claim, the
trier of fact shall determine at the time of trial the amount of
worker compensation benefits to which the claimant would be enti-
tled in the future or the amount to which the claimant would have
been entitled if the claimant had filed a worker compensation claim.
(b) Unless the manufacturer or product seller has expressly
agreed to indemnify or hold an employer harmless for harm to an
employee caused by a product-
(1) the employer shall have no right of subrogation, contribu-
tion, implied indemnity or lien against the manufacturer or pro-
duct seller if the harm is one for which a product liability action
may be brought under this Act; and
(2) the worker compensation insurance carrier of the
employer shall have no right of subrogation against the manufac-
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turer or product seller.
(c) In any product liability action in which damages are sought
for harm for which the person injured is entitled to compensation
under any State or Federal worker compensation law, no third party
tortfeasor may maintain any action for implied indemnity or con-
tribution against the employer or any coemployee of the person who
was injured.
(d) No person entitled to file a claim for benefits persuant to ap-
plicable State or Federal worker compensation laws or who would
have been entitled to file such a claim, or any other person whose
claim would be derivative from such a claim, shall be allowed to
recover in a product liability action against a present or former
employer or worker compensation insurer of the employer or any
coemployee for harm caused by a product.
TIME LIMITATION ON LIABILITY
SEC. 12. (a)(1) If any product is a capital good, no claim alleging
unsafe design as provided in section 5(b), or failure to give adequate
warnings or instructions as provided in section 6(a), may be brought
for harm caused by such a product more than 25 years from the date
of delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was
not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or using
the product as a component in the manufacture of another product.
(2) As used in this subsection, "capital good" means any product,
other than a motor vehicle, or any component of any such product,
if it is also of a character subject to allowance for depreciation
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and was-
(A) used in a trade or business;
(B) held for the production of income; or
(C) sold, leased, or donated to a governmental or private
entity for the production of goods, for training, for demonstra-
tion, or other similar purposes.
(b) Subsection (a) is not applicable if-
(1) the manufacturer or product seller intentionally misrepre-
sented facts about the product or fraudulently concealed infor-
mation about the product, and that conduct was a substantial
cause of the claimant's harm;
(2) the harm of the claimant was caused by the cumulative
effect of prolonged exposure to a defective product; or
(3) the harm, caused within the period referred to in subsec-
tion (a), did not manifest itself until after the expiration of that
period.
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(c) Nothing in subsection (a) shall affect the right of any person
who is subject to liability for harm under this Act to seek and ob-
tain contribution or indemnity from any other person who is respon-
sible for that harm.
(d) No claim under this Act may be brought more than 2 years
from the time the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of due
diligence should have discovered, the harm.
ALTERNATIVE SECTION FOR TIME LIMITATION ON
LIABILITY
SEC. 12. (a)(1) In any product liability action, there is a presump-
tion that the harm of a claimant was not caused because the product
involved was unreasonably dangerous because of its design, or
unreasonably dangerous because of the failure to provide adequate
warning or instructions, if the harm was caused after the end of the
longer of the following periods:
(A) The 10-year period beginning at the time of delivery of
the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged
in the business of either selling such product or using the prod-
uct as a component part of another product.
(B) The period (if any) during which the product seller war-
rants that the product can be safely utilized.
(2) The presumption under this subsection may be rebutted only
by clear and convincing evidence.
(b) The presumption under subsection (a) does not apply if-
(1) the manufacturer or product seller intentionally misrepre-
sented facts about the product or fraudulently concealed infor-
mation about the product, and that conduct was a substantial
cause of the claimant's harm;
(2) the harm of the claimant was caused by the cumulative ef-
fect of prolonged exposure to an unreasonably dangerous pro-
duct; or
(3) the harm, caused within the period referred to in -sub-
section (a), did not manifest itself until after the expiration of
that period.
(c) No claim under this Act may be brought more than 2 years
from the time the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of due
diligence should have discovered, the harm.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
SEC. 13. (a)(1) Punitive damages may be awarded to any claimant
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who establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the harm suf-
fered was the result of the reckless disregard of the manufacturer
or product seller for the safety of product users, consumers, or per-
sons who might be harmed by the product. Punitive damages may
not be awarded in the absence of a compensatory award.
(2) As used in this subsection, "reckless disregard" means con-
duct manifesting a conscious, flagrant indifference to the safety of
those persons who might be harmed by a product and constituting
an extreme departure from accepted practice. A negligent choice
among alternative product designs or warnings, when made in the
ordinary course of business, does not by itself constitute "reckless
disregard".
(b) The trier of fact, in determining under subsection (a) whether
punitive damages should be awarded, shall consider-
(1) the manufacturer's or product seller's awareness of the
likelihood that serious harm would arise from the sale or
manufacture of a product;
(2) the conduct of the manufacturer or product seller upon
discovery that the product caused harm or was related to harm
caused to users or others, including whether upon confirmation
of the problem the manufacturer or product seller took ap-
propriate steps to reduce the risk of harm;
(3) the duration of the conduct and any concealment of it by
the manufacturer or product seller; and
(4) whether the harm suffered by the claimant was partly
the result of the claimant's own negligent conduct.
(c) If the trier of fact determines under subsection (a) that
punitive damages should be awarded to a claimant, the court shall
determine the amount of those damages. In making the determina-
tion, the court shall consider-
(1) all relevant evidence relating to the factors set forth in
subsection (b);
(2) the profitability of the conduct to the manufacturer or
product seller; and
(3) the total effect of other punishment imposed upon the
manufacturer or product seller as a result of the misconduct, in-
cluding punitive damage awards to persons similarly situated to
the claimant and the severity of other penalities to which the
manufacturer or product seller has been or may be subjected.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, a manufacturer
or product seller may introduce relevant evidence of post-
manufacturing improvements in defense of punitive damages.
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SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
SEC. 14. (a) Evidence of measures taken after an event, which if
taken previously would have made the event less likely to occur, is
not admissible to prove liability under this Act in connection with
the event.
(b) This section does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures in a design defect case if offered to impeach a
witness for the manufacturer or product seller who has expressly
denied the feasibility of such a measure.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SEC. 15. If any provision of this Act or the application of it to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act
and the application of the provision to any other person or cir-
cumstance shall not be affected by that invalidation.
EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 16. (a) This Act shall be effective 60 days after the date of
its enactment, and shall apply to all product liability actions com-
menced on or after that date, including any action in which the harm
or the conduct which caused the harm occurred before the effective
date.
(b) If any provision of this Act would (1) shorten the period
within which a claimant may bring a product liability action, or (2)
shorten the period during which a manufacturer is exposed to liabil-
ity under this Act, the claimant may, notwithstanding the otherwise
applicable time period, bring any such action within 1 year after the
effective date of this Act.
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Appendix B
97TH CONGRESS H.R. 5214
1ST SESSION
To provide for a uniform products liability law.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DECEMBER 14, 1981
Mr. SHUMWAY introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee on Energy and Commerce
A BILL
To provide for a uniform products liability law.
Be it in enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled.
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Products Liability Act of 1982".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES
(a) The Congress finds that:
(1) The manufacture and distribution of goods in interstate
commerce, and the insurance of liability therefor, is to a large
extent a national activity which affects national interests in a
variety of important ways.
(2) The rules of products liability law in recent years have
evolved rapidly and haphazardly within and among the States
such that the body of products liability law prevailing in this Na-
tion today is unduly complex, inconsistent, uncertain, and im-
balanced in principle.
(3) This uncertainty and confusion in products liability law,
and the resulting unpredictability of litigation outcome, has been
a principal cause of many problems of national concern, in-
cluding -
(A) increased prices of consumer and industrial products;
(B) increased strains on the court systems, including in-
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creased costs, complexity, and frequency of litigation;
(C) increased deterrents to innovation and to the
development of potentially beneficial products which by
their nature necessarily involve some danger;
(D) increased difficulty for some manufacturers in rais-
ing capital;
(E) increased costs and decreased availability of prod-
ucts liability insurance;
(F) increased numbers of product sellers attempting to
do business without products liability insurance coverage,
jeopardizing their financial stability and the availability of
compensation to injured persons; and
(G) other increased burdens on interstate commerce,
threatening employment and the economy in may diverse
ways.
(4) Products liability insurance rates are set on the basis of
nationwide, rather than individual State, experience because a
product manufactured in one State can readily cause injury in
any of the other States.
(5) A profusion of State statutes has been enacted in recent
years attempting to remedy these problems. Such statutes,
however, have sometimes been drafted in a crisis atmosphere
without due consideration given to their many important im-
plications. Some such statutes have curtailed unduly the rights
of products liability claimants, and all have added to the com-
plexity of and inconsistency in products liability law.
(6) Because of the national scope of the manufacture and
distribution of most products, and of products liability insurance,
there is little that any individual State can do to remedy these
various problems of product liability law.
(b) The purpose of this Act is to facilitate the fair, prompt,
and efficient resolution of cases and controversies involving pro-
ducts liability which arise in the various States and affect com-
merce by-
(1) establishing certain uniform principles which provide
a fair balance between the interests of product users and
product sellers;
(2) assuring that persons injured by unnecessarily
dangerous products will be adequately compensated for their
injuries;
(3) relieving commerce of the adverse effects created by
the existing confusion and uncertainty concerning the legal
rights and obligations of product users and product sellers;
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(4) making products liability insurance more widely available
and affordable, and providing greater stability in rates and
premiums; and
(5) expediting the payment and litigation of products liability
claims and helping to enhance fairness, predictability, and effi-
ciency in the administration of such claims in the legal system.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act:
(1) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, or
transportation (A) between a place in a State and any place outside
of the State, or (B) which affects trade, traffic, commerce, or trans-
portation described in clause (A).
(2) The term "State" means any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Panama Canal Zone, the Nor-
thern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
and any other territory or possession of the United States.
(3) The term "person" means any individual, corporation, com-
pany, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or
any other entity, including any Federal, State, or local governmental
entity.
(4) The term "product" means any object which is capable of
delivery either as an assembled whole or as a component part and is
produced for introduction into trade or commerce. Such term does
not include human tissue, organs, or human blood and its com-
ponents.
(5) The term "products liability action" means any claim or action
brought by a claimant against a product seller for harm caused by a
product. Such term includes, but is not limited to, any action
previously based on strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of ex-
press or implied warranty; misrepresentation, concealment, or non-
disclosure, whether intentional, negligent, or innocent; manufac-
turer's liability; products liability; or any other substantive legal
theory in tort, contract, or otherwise.
(6) The term "claimant" means any person who claims to have
suffered harm from a product and who asserts a products liability
action. If such an action is asserted through or on behalf of an estate
or other representative, the term includes the estate or other
representative in addition to the person harmed.
(7) The term "harm" means (A) damage to property other than
the product itself; (B) personal physical injuries, illness, or death; or
(C) pain or mental harm resulting from such personal physical in-
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juries, illness, or death. The term "harm" does not include commer-
cial loss.
(8) The term "manufacturer" means-
(A) any person who is engaged in a business to design, pro-
duce, make, assemble, fabricate, construct, or remanufacture any
product (or component part thereof); or
(B) any product seller not described under subparagraph (A)
selling products under its own trademark or name, or holding
itself out as a manufacturer to the user of the product. Any pro-
duct seller who acts primarily as a wholesaler, distributor, or
retailer of products may be a manufacturer with respect to a
given product to the extent that such seller plays a significant
role in designing, producing, making, assembling, fabricating,
constructing, altering, modifying, or remanufacturing the aspect
of the product which injures the claimant; but it does not include
one who merely distributes a product and in the course thereof
assembles, services, or otherwise prepares the product as
authorized by the person who manufacturers or produces the
product.
(9)(A) The term "product seller" means, except as provided
under subparagraph (B)-
(i) any manufacturer; or
(ii) any person who, in the course of a business conducted for
that purpose, sells, wholesales, distributes, retails, leases, in-
stalls, prepares, packages, labels, markets, repairs, maintains,
assembles, or otherwise is involved in placing a product in the
stream of commerce.
(B) the term "product seller" does not include-
(i) a seller of real property, unless and to the extent that
such person is engaged in the mass production and sale of stan-
dardized dwellings;
(ii) a provider of professional services who uses or sells pro-
ducts within the legally authorized scope of his or her profes-
sional practice;
(iii) any person who (A) acts in only a financial capacity with
respect to the sale of a product, and (B) is not in the business of
manufacturing, wholesaling, distributing, or retailing products.
(10) The term "representation" means any explicit statement,
affirmation of fact, promise, or description relating to a product.
(11) The term "feasible" means practicable within the technical
and scientific knowledge which is available, adequately
demonstrated, and economically feasible for use by a product seller
at the time of manufacture of a product.
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(12) The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that
measure or degree of proof which, by the weight, credit, and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side, establishes that it is more
probable than not that a fact occurred or did not occur.
(13) The term "clear and convincing evidence" means that
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
established. The level of proof required to satisfy this standard is
more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
SEC. 4. PREEMPTION OF OTHER LAWS AND JURISDICTION.
(a) This Act supersedes any other Federal or State law regard-
ing matters governed by this Act to the extent that such is inconsis-
tent with this Act. Except as provided in this Act, there shall be no
recovery for harm or damage of any type caused by a product, other
than for commercial loss or damage to the product itself.
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, a claimant may bring a pro-
ducts liability action under this Act-
(1) in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State; or
(2) in an appropriate district court of the United States, but
only if-
(A) the United States or any agency or officer of the
Federal Government is a party; or
(B) diversity jurisdiction exists.
SEC. 5. BASIC STANDARDS OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR MANUFACTURERS.
(a)(1) In any products liability action brought against a manufac-
turer for harm allegedly caused by a product, the manufacturer
shall be liable to a claimant only if the claimant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence-
(A) that the product was unreasonably dangerous-
(i) in construction, under subsection (b);
(ii) in design, under subsection (c), and that the manufac-
turer was negligent in selling the product in such condition;
(iii) because the manufacturer failed to provide adequate
warnings or instructions, under subsection (d), and that the
manufacturer was negligent in failing to provide such infor-
mation; or
(iv) because the product did not conform to a representa-
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tion made by the manufacturer with respect to the product,
under subsection (e);
(B) that the unreasonably dangerous aspect of such product
was the proximate cause of the harm complained of by the clai-
mant; and
(C) that the particular product unit which allegedly harmed
the claimant was manufactured by the defendant.
(2) Neither the claimant nor the manufacturer may prove any
fact or issue by showing that the same fact or issue was raised,
litigated, and determined adversely to such other party in another
action unless they were adverse parties to each other in the other
action and had the opportunity and reason fully to contest the fact
or issue therein.
(b) A product shall be considered unreasonably dangerous in con-
struction only if it is determined that, when the product left the con-
trol of the manufacturer, the product deviated in a material way-
(1) from the design specifications or performance standards
of the manufacturer; or
(2) from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (4), a product shall be con-
sidered unreasonably dangerous in design only if it is determined
that the manufacturer failed to adopt an alternative design that-
(A) was available to the manufacturer when the product was
designed, under paragraph (2);
(B) was on balance better than the chosen design, under
paragraph (3); and
(C) would have prevented the claimant's harm.
(2) An alternative design shall be considered available to the
manufacturer when the product was designed if the alternative
design was known at that time or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have been known by the manufacturer to exist and to be
feasible for use in the product by the manufacturer.
(3) An alternative design shall be considered better than the
manufacturer's chosen design if the alternative design-
(A) was significantly safer than the chosen design. The alter-
native design was safer than the chosen design if the alternative
design would have provided both-
(i) better safety than that of the chosen design as to the
particular hazard which allegedly caused the claimant's
harm; and
(ii) better overall safety than that of the chosen design.
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The overall safety of the alternative design is better if the
hazards it eliminates are greater than any new hazards it
creates for any persons and for any uses;
(B) was not more expensive than the chosen design, unless
the added safety benefits of the alternative design were
significantly greater than the added expense;
(C) was not less useful or desirable than the chosen design,
unless the added safety benefits of the alternative design were
significantly greater than the losses of usefulness or desirability;
and
(D) was not in violation of any statute, regulation or man-
datory safety standard of Federal or State government.
(4) A product shall not be considered unreasonably dangerous in
design where the claimant's harm resulted from-
(A) a manner of use of the product other than that which
would be reasonably expected of an ordinary person who is likely
to use the product; or
(B) an alteration or modification of the product other than
that which would be reasonably expected of an ordinary person
who is likely to use the product.
(d)(1) A product shall be considered unreasonably dangerous
because of the failure of the manufacturer to provide adequate
warnings of danger or instructions on safe use only if it is deter-
mined that such danger or safety information-
(A) was available to the manufacturer, under paragraph (2);
(B) was reasonably necessary, under paragraph (3);
(C) was not provided effectively to an appropriate person,
under paragraph (4); and
(D) would have prevented the claimant's harm, under
paragraph (5).
(2) Danger or safety information shall be considered available to
the manufacturer-
(A) when the product was sold, if the manufacturer knew or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered such
information by that time; or
(B) after the product was sold, if the manufacturer knew or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered such
information in time to avoid the claimant's harm.
(3) Warnings and instructions shall be considered reasonably
necessary of they (A) concern dangers which are significant, and (B)
provide information which would be useful to persons likely to use
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the product. Such information is not reasonably necessary with
respect to dangers-
(A) that were obvious or known to the user or to another in
a position to act on his behalf or for his protection, including the
user's physician, employer, or other person in control of the pro-
duct;
(B) that appeared trivial at the time, considering the
remoteness of the risk, the triviality of the expected harm, and
the likelihood that users would disregard warnings and instruc-
tions on more important risks if provided with an excess of in-
formation;
(C) associated with manners of use of the product other than
those that would be reasonably expected of an ordinary person
who is likely to use the product; or
(D) associated with alterations or modifications of the pro-
duct other than those that would be reasonably expected of an
ordinary "person who is likely to use the product.
(4)(A) Except as provided below, any necessary warnings and in-
structions shall be provided directly and effectively to the user if
feasible and if a manufacturer in the exercise of reasonable care
would do so in view of the hazards involved and the risk that the
user would not otherwise receive or comprehend the information.
Such information shall be considered effectively provided if it is con-
veyed in a manner likely to catch the attention of and be understood
by the person to whom it is provided. Such information need not be
provided directly to the user if-
(i) the manufacturer provided such warnings or instructions
to a person who was reasonably expected to pass them on to the
actual product user or to another who was reasonably expected
to take action to avoid the harm:
(ii) the product involved is one that may legally be used only
by or under the supervision of a class of experts, and such warn-
ings or instructions were provided to the using or supervisory
expert;
(iii) the product was used in a workplace, and such warnings
or instructions were provided to the employer of the claimant,
or to the person having possession or custody of the product,
because there was no feasible means of transmitting them
directly to the claimant; or
(iv)(I) the product was sold as a component part, in bulk, or
as a raw material to be incorporated or converted into another
product; and
(II) such warnings or instructions were provided to the
[Vol. 18
PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATION
manufacturer's immediate vendee.
(B) In the event that it is determined that danger or safety infor-
mation was available to the manufacturer in accordance with
paragraph (2)(B), the manufacturer shall not be liable if it made
reasonable efforts to provide effectively such information to an ap-
propriate person under subparagraph (A).
(5) The failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions shall
be considered to have caused the claimant's harm if it is determined
that the claimant or a person acting on his behalf would have taken
action which would have avoided the harm if such warnings or in-
structions had been provided.
(e)(1) A product shall be considered unreasonably dangerous
because it did not conform to a representation only if it is deter-
mined that-
(A) the claimant, or a person acting on the claimant's behalf,
relied on a representation made by the manufacturer or its
agent about a material fact concerning the product; and
(B) the representation was untrue
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term "material fact"
means any specific characteristic or quality of the product. Such
term does not include a general opinion about, or praise of, the pro-
duct.
(3) A product seller may be subject to liability under this subsec-
tion although it did not engage in negligent or fraudulent conduct in
making the representation.
SEC. 6. STANDARDS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRODUCT
SELLERS OTHER THAN MANUFACTURERS.
(a)(1) Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), in any
products liability action brought against a product seller other than
a manufacturer for harm allegedly caused by a product, such seller
shall be liable to a claimant only if the claimant proves by -a
preponderance of the evidence-
(A) that such product seller failed to exercise reasonable
care with respect to the product; and
(B) that such failure was the proximate cause of the harm.
(2) A seller other than a manufacturer shall not be subject to
liability under this subsection if each seller-
(A) did not know at the time it sold the product of the
danger that harmed the claimant; or
(B) did not have both reason and a reasonable opportunity to
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inspect the product in a manner which would have revealed the
existence of that danger.
(b) A product seller other than a manufacturer who makes a
representation about any material fact concerning a product shall be
subject to liability for harm to the claimant caused by the product in
the same manner as the manufacturer under subsection 5(e).
(c) A product seller other than the manufacturer shall be subject
to liability without regard to fault for harm to the claimant caused
by defects arising in the product while the product is under its con-
trol or under the control of a prior product seller other than the
manufacturer.
(d) A product seller other than a manufacturer -shall be subject
to liability for harm to the claimant caused by a product where the
manufacturer would have been liable under section 5, if-
(1) the manufacturer cannot be located or probably is not
subject to service of process under the laws of the claimant's
domicile or other jurisdiction where claimant brings suit; or
(2) the court determines that it is probable that the claimant
will be unable to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer.
(e) Neither the claimant nor a product seller other than a
manufacturer may prove any fact or issue by showing that the same
fact or issue was raised, litigated, and determined adversely to such
other party in another action unless they were adverse parties in
the other action and had the opportunity and reason fully to contest
the fact or issue therein.
SEC. 7. RELEVANCE OF GOVERNMENT STANDARDS AND
CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS.
(a) In any products liability action for harm allegedly caused by
a product-
(1) if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the aspect of the product or its use of which the claimant
complains failed to comply with applicable mandatory Federal or
State government safety standards existing at the time of
manufacture and pertaining directly to that aspect of the pro-
duct or its use, the claimant shall be deemed to have satisfied
the proof requirements of section 5(a)(1)(A) or 6(a)(1)(A) with
respect to such aspect of the product or its use unless the pro-
duct seller proves by clear and convincing evidence that its
failure to comply with such standards was a reasonably pru-
dent course of conduct under the circumstances; and
(2) if the product seller proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the aspect of the product or its use of which the
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claimant complains complied with applicable mandatory Federal
or State government safety standards existing at the time of
manufacture or thereafter and pertaining directly to that aspect
of the product or its use, the claimant shall be deemed to have
failed to satisfy the proof requirements of section 5(a)(1)(a) or
6(a)(1)(A) with respect to such aspect of the product or its use
unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that
such standards were unsound.
(b) In any products liability action for harm allegedly caused by
a product-
(1) if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the aspect of the product or its use of which the claimant
complains failed to comply with applicable mandatory contract
specifications of a Federal, State, or local government pertaining
directly to that aspect of the product or its use, the claimant
shall be deemed to have satisfied the proof requirements of sec-
tion 5(a)(1)(A) or 6(a)(1)(A); and
(2) if the product seller proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the aspect of the product or its use of which the
claimant complains complied with applicable mandatory contract
specifications of a Federal, State, or local government pertaining
directly to that aspect of the product or its use, the claimant
shall be deemed to have failed to satisfy the proof requirements
of section 5(a)(1)(A) or 6(a)(1)(A).
(c) For purposes of this section, the phrase "the aspect of the
product or its use of which the claimant complains" shall include any
failure to warn or instruct.
SEC. 8. EVIDENCE OF POSTMANUFACTURING
IMPROVEMENTS.
No evidence shall be admissible in any products liability action,
except as provided in section 11(f), of any alteration, modification,
improvement, repair, change in or discontinuance of the manufac-
ture, construction, design, formula, standards, preparation, process-
ing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instruction,
marketing, advertising, packaging, or labeling of a product, whether
made by the defendant or any other person after the date of
manufacture of the product, except as relevant in a design case to
impeach a witness for the product seller who expressly denies the
feasibility of such improvement.
SEC. 9. COMPARATIVE RESPONSIBILITY.
(a) All products liability actions under this Act shall be governed
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by the principles of comparative responsibility. Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (b)(4), the comparative responsibility at-
tributed to the claimant shall not bar the claimant's recovery but
shall reduce the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the
claimant to the extent proportionate to the responsibility attributed
to the claimant.
(b)(1) In all such actions involving comparative responsibility, the
court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury
to answer special interrogatories (or, if there is no jury, the court
shall make findings) specifying-
(A) the amount of damages the claimant has suffered in
harm; and
(B) the separate percentages of the total responsibility at-
tributable to all parties, including the claimant and any non par-
ties responsible for the harm in any way.
(2) In determining and allocating responsibility under this sec-
tion, the trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis, the
nature of the conduct of each person responsible for the harm of the
claimant and the extent of the proximate causal relation between
such conduct and the damages claimed. A person's responsibility for
the claimant's harm shall be based upon the principles of liability in
this Act, the person's knowledge of the risk, and whether the per-
son's creation of the risk or actions toward the product were
unreasonable.
(3) In the case of responsibility of the employer of the claimant
or any coemployee of the claimant for the claimant's harm, damages
shall be reduced-
(A) in accordance with section 10(a) if such section is ap-
plicable; or
(B) in accordance with this section if the amount of damages
apportioned to such employer or coemployee hereunder is
greater than the amount under subparagraph (A).
(4) If one person's responsibility for the claimant's harm was
trivial as compared to the responsibility of one or more other per-
sons, the responsibility of such other person or persons shall be
deemed the sole proximate cause of the claimant's harm, and the
first person shall have no legal responsibility therefor.
(c)(1) The court shall determine the amount of damages to be
awarded to each claimant in accordance with the findings and rul-
ings made under subsection (b), and shall enter judgment in accord-
ance with such findings and rulings against each party determined
to be liable.
(2) In any case in which a party is responsible for a distinct harm
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or in which there exists some other reasonable basis for apportion-
ing the responsibility for harm caused by a party on an individual
basis, damages shall be apportioned severally.
(3) Upon motion made by a claimant not more than one year
after judgment against a joint tortfeasor in any products liability ac-
tion has been entered and appeals have been exhausted, the court
may determine whether any part of such joint tortfeasor's obligation
is not collectible from such person. Any amount of obligation which
the court determines is uncollectible from that tortfeasor shall be
reallocated as an obligation to be paid by the other joint tortfeasors
involved in the action according to the respective percentages of
their responsibility as determined under subsection (b).
SEC. 10. EFFECT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS.
(a) In the case of any products liability action in which damages
are sought for an injury for which the person injured is entitled to
compensation under any State or Federal workers' compensation
law, any award of such damages shall be reduced by the sum of (1)
the amount paid as workers' compensation benefits for such injury,
and (2) the present value of all future workers' compensation
benefits payable to the employee for such unjury.
(b) Unless the product seller has expressly agreed to indemnify
or hold harmless an employer for harm to an employee caused by a
product, neither the employer nor its workers' compensation in-
surance carrier shall have any right of subrogation, contribution, in-
demnity, or lien against the product seller.
(c) If final judgment in a products liability action brought by an
employee under this Act has been entered before there has been a
determination made with respect to the entitlement of the employee
to workers' compensation benefits under State or Federal law, the
product seller may bring an action after the date such final judg-
ment is entered-
(1) for reduction of such judgment (in accordance with
subsection (a)) by the amount of the workers' compensation
benefits to which such employee is subsequently determined to
be entitled; or
(2) for recoupment from the employee of the amount of the
workers' compensation benefits to which such employee is subse-
quently determined to be entitled if the product seller had
already paid to the employee, in satisfaction of such judgment
under this Act, an amount which includes in whole or in part the
amount of such workers' compensation benefits.
(d) In any products liability action in which damages are sought
for harm for which the person injured is entitled to compensation
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under any State or Federal workers' compensation law, no third party
tortfeasor may maintain any action for indemnity or contribution
against the employer of the person who was injured.
SEC. 11. PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
(a) Following a determination of the product seller's liability for
actual damages and the amount thereof, and following a determina-
tion of all posttrial motions thereon, punitive damages may be
sought by a claimant upon motion to the court. If such damages
have been properly pleaded, are awardable under State law, and are
not otherwise inappropriate as a matter of law, the court, sitting
without a jury, shall thereupon take evidence relevant to liability
for and the amount of such damages.
(b) A product seller shall be liable for punitive damages only if
the court determines that in selling the product in violation of sec-
tion 5 or 6-
(1) the product seller acted with a flagrant indifference to
consumer safety; and
(2) the violation of section 5 or 6 was an extreme departure
from accepted practice.
(c) If the court determines that the product seller should be
liable for punitive damages, it shall base its determination of the
amount of such damages, subject to the limitations in subsections (d)
and (e), upon a consideration of the following-
(1) the likelihood that serious harm would arise from the
misconduct of the product seller;
(2) the extent of the product seller's awareness of the
likelihood that such harm would arise;
(3) the profitability of the misconduct to the product seller;
(4) the duration of the misconduct and any concealment
thereof by the product seller;
(5) the attitude and conduct of the executive officers of the
product seller upon discovery of the misconduct, including
whether or not the misconduct was thereupon promptly ter-
minated;
(6) the financial condition of the product seller;
(7) the total effect of other punishment imposed and likely to
be imposed upon the product seller as a result of the miscon-
duct, including any compensatory and punitive damage awards
to persons similarly situated to the claimant and any criminal
penalties to which the product seller has been or may be sub-
jected; and
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(8) whether the harm suffered by the claimant was also the
result of the claimant's own reckless disregard for personal safety.
(d) The amount of punitive damages that may be recovered by
one claimant may not exceed, but may be less than, twice the
amount of actual damages the claimant is determined to have suf-
fered, but in no event shall an award of punitive damages exceed $1
million for any one claimant.
(e) If the product seller proves that it has previously paid or
been finally adjudicated liable for punitive damages and fines total-
ing the lesser of $5,000,000 or 5 per centum of its net worth, its
liability for punitive damages shall not exceed the lesser of-
(1) claimant's litigation expenses, including reasonable
attorneys' fees; or
(2) the amount determined under subsection (d).
(f) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 8, a product seller
may introduce relevant evidence of postmanufactring improvements
in defense of punitive damages.
SEC. 12. PERIODS OF LIMITATION AND REPOSE FOR
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS.
(a) Any claim under this Act must be brought within three years
from the time the claimant discovered, or in the exercise of due
diligence should have discovered, the harm and its cause.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), no products liability action
may be commenced more than ten years after the product seller
sold the particular product that caused the claimant's harm, except
as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, unless such
seller expressly represented in writing that it could be used safely
for a longer period. If a longer period was so represented, an action
must be commenced within three years from the earlier of-
(1) the end of such period represented; or
(2) the period provided in subsection (a).
(c) An action may be commenced within fifteen years after the
sale, but not thereafter, if-
(1) the claimant's harm is caused within ten years after the
product is sold but does not manifest itself until thereafter; or
(2) the claimant's harm is proven by clear and convincing
evidence to have been caused by an intentional misrepresenta-
tion of a product seller.
(d) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of any person
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subject to liability for harm under this Act to seek and obtain con-
tribution or indemnity from any other person responsible for such
harm.
SEC. 13. SEVERANCE CLAUSE.
If any part of this Act shall be adjudged by any court to be in-
valid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate any other
part of this Act but shall instead be confined in its effect to the
specific part of this Act found to be invalid.
SEC. 14. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act shall be effective and applied to actions commenced on
or after January 1, 1983.
